Philosophy and Religion / J. C. Chatterji: Hindu Realism |
Jagadish Chandra Chatterji
Hindu Realism
A—The Analytic Aspect
Kala and Dik.
Misconceptions about Kala and Dik
As to the next two Realities, Kala and Dik, as taught by Hindu Realism, there has been much misconception, owing as much to confusion in regard to their real import as to the rendering, by Substance, of the word Dravya, which is given as the general name to all the nine classes of Realities. Dravya means a something that is independently real and is self-subsisting. Thus a Force even may be a Dravya if it can be shown to have an independent existence. And there is no reason why Kala and Dik should not be Dravyas in this sense.1
Kala
That Kala exists as a Reality or as an independently existing Force, is maintained by the following reasoning:—
All perceptible things are perceived as moving, changing, coming into existence and passing out of it.2 They are produced and destroyed. There must be some Force or Power which thus brings them into existence and moves them off.3 The things themselves cannot do it. If the discrete things had the power of self-origination and self- movement, then, there is no reason why there should be that mutual relation between things which persists even when they are all moving and changing or why there should be that orderly movement which there is in the Universe that we perceive.4 In the Universe things are all moving in a regular and orderly fashion; they come into existence also in order, and in seasons. There must, therefore, be something which makes this orderly movement and seasonable origination and destruction of things possible.
And if it exists, it must also be conceived as having full scope and operation over all discrete things, because all discrete things are moving and changing. Akasha might have been this Power inasmuch as it is in touch with all discrete things; but it cannot be so, because, as we saw, Akasha is also the basis of a special property, namely, sound, which is produced in it the moment it comes into a special relation with discrete things.
Things with Special Property Can Affect or Be Affected by Others Only Through Special Relations.
Now, anything which manifests a special quality can affect, or be affected by, other things, only when it comes into special relation with them, and not by a merely general relation,—that is to say, by mere aggregation or even by mere contact.5 Paramanus, for instance, are things which manifest the four special qualities named above. But they cannot do this by merely coming together, that is, by forming mere aggregates. When, however, they enter into special relations with one another and form compounded wholes, i.e., secondary units (chemical or biological), then only do the special qualities appear. But as they can appear only when the Paramanus producing the secondary units affect one another, the appearance of the special qualities under the above conditions also means that the Paramanus as the bases of the special qualities can so affect or be affected only when they enter into special relations one with the other, but not by mere aggregation.6
Similarly, we shall see7 that Atmans, which have also special qualities of their own, can never affect or be affected by things, unless they come into special relations with the latter; and this is so in spite of the fact that, being all-pervading entities, they are always in touch, i.e., in general relation, with all things. But the moment the Atmans enter into special relations with things and thus affect or are affected by them, there at once arise the special qualities which belong to them. It is no doubt true that some Atmans can affect and be affected by all things. But that is so not because they are in mere touch with all things, but because they have that special and intimate relation with all things which other Atmans have only with a few things.8 | 9
Thus we find, first, that there is nothing which has a special quality and can yet affect or be affected by other things without entering into special relations with them. Secondly, as soon as things having special qualities enter into the various special relations with other things and thus affect or are affected by them, there at once appear, in them, those special qualities which are their own.
This being so, Akasha, which has a special quality of its own, cannot possibly affect all things equally by mere contact. To do so it must enter into special relations with them, and thereby have at once sound produced in it.
Therefore, if Akasha were that Power and Reality which affects and thereby moves on everything that is movable, it would have, in the first place, to enter into that special and intimate relation with all things, which it has now with one thing and now with another, according as the one or the other produces sound in it. Secondly, it must have this universally special relation (if such a phrase can be used) with all things, not only occasionally, but always; for all things, capable of movement, are moving always. Thirdly, as they move, all movements of theirs would be always producing sound. But this is never the case.
We must, therefore, conclude that, that Reality which moves all things by having a general relation with all, is something other than Akasha. For similar reasons it cannot be identified with any other all-pervading Reality which has special properties and is thus capable of coming into special relations.
We must, therefore, recognise that there must be a general principle of movement, which has only a general relation with every thing that moves, comes into being, changes and passes out of existence. It is this something, this Power or Force, which is Kala.
How and in What Sense Kala is Time.
As it moves and changes things, it gives rise in the percipient to the notions, with regard to those things, of past, present and future; of old and new10 That is to say, it produces all those relations which are termed temporal and is in this sense only Time.
It must be conceived as a Reality11 because it cannot be shown to be dependent for its existence upon anything; rather it is upon Kala that all moving and discrete things depend, in so far as they have movements and change.
It must be also a Reality which pervades the whole Universe; that is to say, has relation with all things that are moving and changing.12 In fact it is a Reality which relates things together in regard to their movements and changes, and thus enables a percipient, as suggested above, to speak of some things as old, and of others as young, with reference to one another.
Dik.
The existence of the next Reality as recognised by Realism, namely, Dik or the Power, Force or Principle of relative position, which discrete things hold, is maintained in the following way13:
Things are not only moving and changing, hut they hold relative positions,14 that is, stand at relative distances from one another at all moments of time. They are held together in these positions.15 That is to say, they must be conceived as being acted upon by another Power or Force, which acts in a direction, opposite (viparita) to that in which Kala operates,16 and thus acting in opposition to Kala, makes the relative position of things at any given moment of time possible. Here again the things themselves cannot thus maintain their relative positions.17 For they are discrete and separated from one another; and unless there be something else to hold them together, there is no reason why or how they should thus retain their respective positions and positional relations to one another, while all things are moving on by virtue of Kala. Nor can Akasha, although all-pervading, be the Power which keeps things in their relative positions, for exactly the same reasons for which it cannot be the all-moving Power. That is to say, it is incapable of affecting or operating on things without entering into special relations, and without thereby having sound produced in it. But the Power that can hold all things together at relative distances from one another, at any given moment of time, and can thus enable them all to retain their mutual positional relations, must be a thing which has only a general relation with all, and yet, by virtue of that relation alone, operates on them all, as it must, to keep them in positional order. Nor can Kala be this Reality; because, as already said, the Power we are considering is a Power which acts in a way which is exactly contrary to that in which Kala operates; and operating in opposition to Kala makes relative position possible. We must, therefore, recognize the existence of a separate principle as the upholder of positional relations and order on the part of discrete things. This something, this Reality, Power or Force, is called Dik.
Dik Produces Notions of Spatial Directions but is not Space.
As it upholds relative positions among things, it gives rise in their percipients to the notions of far and near; in this direction or in that direction; of east and west; and so on.18 That is to say, it produces relations among things of the nature of what may be called spatial directions. But Dik cannot be called space itself, if that means place, locality or room. This latter is really Akasha.19 | 20| 21 It is in Akasha as space, i.e., place or room, and as a Reality, that Dik holds things in different positions.
Difference Between Akasha as Space and Dik.
The difference between Akasha as space, or place, and Dik, is much the same as that between, say, a wall on which, and cords by which, pictures may be hung. The wall is or supplies the space, place or room, and the cords hold the pictures in different positions in the space so supplied. This is a point which should be clearly borne in mind as otherwise there will be, as indeed there has been, much confusion made in regard to the meanings of Akasha and Dik.22
Dik is a Reality because it cannot be shown to be dependent on anything else for its existence.23 It must be conceived as all-pervading, that is, having relations with all things, inasmuch as all discrete things exist in relative positions in the Universe.
Kala and Dik Uphold the Universe in Akasha Space.
Kala and Dik are thus Realities which hold together the sensible Universe as, in the infinite space of Akasha, it ever moves on in well-regulated and seasoned cycles, and yet maintains that positional order which, for ever, obtains between its various members.24
Footnotes
1. Jnana, i.e., consciousness or even experience, is spoken of as dravya. If consciousness can be called substance, then dravya is substance. See Shri-Bhash., II. ii. 27, p. 1573.
2. Vaish. Su., II, ii. 9; VII. I, 25. Prashasta, p. 25, line 10.
3. One of the reasons why there has been so much misunderstanding in regard to Kala is that it has been taken to be Time in the Western sense of the word. That Kala is the great power which whirls things round is a common Hindu notion. See, for instance, Vish. Pur., I. i.
4. |Kandali, p. 68, lines 10 et seq.
5. N. V. T. T., p. 280, line last but one. Ki. Va., p. 114.
6. This seems to be a very old argument. It is given by Vachaspati Mishra in N. V. T. T., p. 280. Udayana also quotes it in Ki. Va. and attributes it to an Acharya. This Acharya, we are told by Vardhamana, is Vyoma-Shiva (Ki. Va., p. 114). Udayana thinks it defective as stated by Vyoma-Shiva. But he does not seem to discard it altogether. For lie says that Kala, Dik and Manas must be conceived as without any ‘special qualities’ by virtue of dharmigrahaka-pramana (Ki. Va., p. 110). He could not possibly have urged this as a reason if he discarded the old argument attributed by him to Vyoma-Shiva.
Nowhere that I know of is this argument stated in any but the curtest form, almost unintelligible to any but those taught orally by the Hindus themselves. The common form of it is simply ‘Visheshagunavattvat.’
7. Infra.
8. Infra, “Atman” and “The Synthetic Aspect” chapters.
9. Prashasta says that Brahma was ordered to create the universal order of things. This would seem to mean that the universe was not due to Brahma’s Adrishta. But he also speaks of the Universe coming to an end when the time comes for Brahma’s Freedom (Apavarga). This can only mean that during his life, i.e., the existence of the Universe, Brahma is not Free, namely from Adrishta. And if he has Adrishta, then it is obvious that the Universe is produced by it. In any case it is a common Hindu idea that one can rise to be a Brahma (i.e., gain Brahmatva) by his Karma. See Nilakantha on Ma. Bhar., I. 64. 43.
10. Vaish. Su., Upask., and Vivr., II ii. 6. Nya. Var., II. i. 36; N. V. T. T., p. 280, etc.
11. Vaish. Su., II. ii. 7; N. V. T. T., p. 280, last line.
12. Vaish. Su., VII. I 25.
13. Like Kala, Dik has been much misunderstood. That Dik is a power which holds things in various positions is a common Hindu idea. This power is often spoken of as the Elephants of the quarters’ that hold up the world in space, or as divine maids that uphold creation. It is also spoken of as the arms that support and uphold things. See Nilakantha on Ma. Bhar., I. lxiv. 38; Ma. Bhar. III. cc. (i.e. cc = 200) 15; Bhag., V. xx. 39; Sha. Ka., Sub voce; Chatur Va. Chi. Ma., I. 233. 7, etc.
Dik is not Space, if by that is meant an expanse, extension or room. Space in this sense, and if conceived as a Reality not as a mere and absolute Nothing, is Akasha in which all things exist as in a locality (Prashasta, pp. 88-89). See Ballantyne’s translation of Nya. Su. with extracts, Book. IV., p. 26 (top).
The Vaish. Sutra, II. ii. 10, beginning the section on Dik, simply says that the characteristic of Dik is that it is from or on account of it that “ there arises the fact that this thing is here or there from this other thing.”
It is clear that in this Sutra only relative position of things is alluded to and not their extent or expanse or their occupation of space, each by itself.
That this is so will be seen also from Bha. Par. 45.Dik would not be unlike ‘gravitation’ if the latter could be regarded as an independent Reality and not a mere property of things.
14. Vaish. Su., II. ii. 10.
15. Infra.
16. Ki. Va., p. 144.
17. Kandali, p. 67, lines 19 et seq.
18. Bhasha Par., 45.
19. Prashasta, p. 22, line 11; Kandali, p. 22, line 17.
21. See note 13.
22. Trans. Tarkas., p. 133., para. 2
23. Vaish. Su., II. ii. 11; N. V. T. T., p. 280, last line.
24. Prashasta, p. 22.