Philosophy and Religion / J. C. Chatterji: Hindu Realism

Jagadish Chandra Chatterji

Hindu Realism

A—The Analytic Aspect

The Paramanus

First, as regards the Paramanus, there are certain facts which, as facts, are undisputed.

Reality of the Sensible

People may dispute as to their ultimate nature, but not their existence as facts of experience. Of these, we experience some by means of the senses. These may, therefore, be called sensible experiences. Now, as such sensible experiences do undoubtedly exist, so there are and must be, other than and outside of ourselves as individual experiencers, things by which such experiences are produced. If we call these things collectively the sensible world or sensible matter, on account of our experiencing them by means of the senses, then such a sensible world does and must exist independently, and outside, of us as experiencing individuals. That such a world seems to exist nobody can doubt; for we all perceive it so. Only, some may, indeed do, imagine that this world as existing outside is a mere seeming. They hold that what really exists are only our own ideas and impressions, that is to say, purely subjective things; and that it is these alone which appear as the sensible world, which, therefore, has no independent existence whatever, as something apart from and other than our own experience—our own ideas and impressions. This cannot be true. There is, and must be, a sensible world which exists as something different from, and outside, our own experiences as individuals, and by which the sensible experiences we have are produced. That this is so we must admit for the following reasons:—

(a) It exists outside us as individuals, because,¹ if it did not, then the experiences of waking life would be of exactly the same nature as those dreams which are purely subjective.² For such dreams are experiences which have, outside them, no objects to which they correspond; and of which they are experiences had by the experiencer. That purely subjective dreams are without outside objects nobody will deny. But how do we know that there are no outside objects corresponding to subjective dreams? It is obvious we know this because we do not perceive them again on waking. But if our reason for believing that objects experienced in subjective dreams do not exist apart from our experience of them, is because they are not perceived as objects in waking, then it follows that what is experienced in waking does exist apart from our experiences. We can say that A does not exist, because not perceived as B, only if we know that what is perceived as B does exist.

In other words, we deny the existence of things perceived in subjective dreams, because we are certain of the existence of things experienced in waking, that is, by means of the senses. This being so, it is absurd to deny their existence again.

(b) If the sensible did not exist, subjective dreams themselves would be impossible.³ Because they, like memories and imaginings, are nothing but repetitions, in various forms, of things already experienced as existing outside.

(c) Then again, if the sensible things did not exist apart from our ideas and experiences of them, there is no reason why we should not see them at will and continuously, just as we can have our own ideas at will and for as long as we like.⁴ But in regard to sensible things, we find, that we perceive them only so long as they remain in relation with us. This is so only because they exist independently of us.

(d) Then, there are, in regard to sensible things, what we call right perceptions and experiences as distinguished from mistaken ones and hallucinations.⁵ This would be impossible if the sensible things did not exist. For we call that experience of a sensible thing right, which corresponds to what exists in its true nature as an externally existing thing, and, wrong and imaginary, that which does not so correspond.

For all these reasons, and others which might be adduced,⁶ there exists a sensible world, which is independent of, and apart from, the subjective ideas and experiences of individual percipients.

And if it exists, it must be composed of Paramanus, i.e., super-sensible Realities without any magnitude whatever.

Difference Between Hindu and Western Realism

Unlike many, if not most, schools of Realism in the West, there is no Hindu system of realistic thought, which has ever held that the essential basis of the sensible world is a something or somethings which must have magnitude and extension. This idea, that the essences of the sensible world are extended things, has no doubt found great support, until recently, in the chemical theory of atoms regarded as “hard and solid” and absolutely simple factors. But with the gradual passing away of this theory, as it is said to be doing in consequence of the investigations of Prof. J. J. Thomson and others, perhaps there will be, in the West, many more now who will see how it is possible to be a thorough-going realist and yet maintain, as the Hindu Realists of all shades have always maintained, that the ultimate constituents of sensible things are indeed real, self-subsisting, and independent of all percipients, but they are not solid, hard particles with any magnitude, however small. A view, to be classed as Realism, need perhaps have no more in it, than the simple admission that the sensible world should have some real and eternal basis or bases, producing and upholding what we perceive by the senses, and existing independently of the percipient. These bases may be any independent Realities, with or without magnitude. They might even be mere stimuli producing the sensible, if the stimuli could be things which existed by themselves, eternally and independently of all perceiving entities or of anything else. This being so, the Hindu Realist maintains, that the ultimate bases of the sensible world, and the originators of the sensible qualities are neither matter, which must have magnitude or extension like the atoms as formerly conceived by chemistry, nor even stimuli as generally understood in the West, but Realities—things that might be as well called real and independently existing Powers or Forces—which are without, any magnitude whatever. And he does so for the following reasons:—⁷

Two Classes of the Sensible

What we have called sensible things or the sensible world may be divided into two classes, the visible and the invisible— the invisible being the vast aerial atmosphere, with whatever else it may contain in it in an invisible form; and the visible, everything else.

The Sensible Discrete

Now, all these sensible things, visible or invisible, are of limited extent, and, as such, discrete; that is to say, being of limited extent, they consist of parts which are separable from one another. That the visible things are discrete needs no argument. That the invisible aerial atmosphere also is limited in extent, and consists of discrete parts, is now well-known in the West.

The Hindus established this idea by pointing to the fact that there are movements in the air, whirlwinds and so on.⁸ These phenomena would not be possible, if the aerial atmosphere were an all-filling Reality, that is, an absolute Continuum, and were not composed of discrete parts. If a thing be an all-filling Continuum, no parts of it can possibly move away from their places nor can other parts come in from some other quarter. Nor can it have expansion, contraction or undulation or any other form of motion, all of which phenomena imply displacement of parts. If, therefore, the aerial atmosphere were an all-filling Continuum, that is to say, if it were not composed of movable parts, there could be no commotion in it. But we know there are such commotions of the atmosphere, as in storms, cyclones and so on. Therefore it must also be of limited magnitude and composed of parts.

Thus, all sensible things are of limited extent, and as such discrete, that is, consisting of parts. On account of this fact, it may be laid down as a general principle, that—things of limited extent must consist of parts.

How things of limited magnitude are produced.

The next point to consider is, that a discrete thing of limited magnitude can be produced in three different ways: ⁹—

(a) By the addition of things having magnitudes.
(b) By the expansion or contraction of a thing of another magnitude; and finally
(c) By a number of things standing, not contiguously, but at suitable distances from one another, and then entering into a combination of unification, so as to form a single unit, which, as a whole, may behave as one individual, and in which the originating parts are no longer entirely independent of the whole. In this case the originating parts or factors need not have any magnitude whatever.

As for examples of the first two cases, they are quite obvious. But in regard to the third, some explanation is needed.

Secondary units or Organic Wholes (Avayavins)

First of all, we must admit that there is a great difference between a mere aggregate, as that of a number of atoms of Hydrogen and Oxygen, or of a number of living cells put together anyhow, and a unified whole such as the atoms of Hydrogen and Oxygen make when combined as water, or a single living organism like some animal body.¹⁰ The unified wholes, which we may call secondary or produced units or individuals behave as a single thing; but this cannot be said to be the case in a mere aggregate of atoms or of cells. The secondary unit is a new thing, quite other than, and different from, the mere aggregate. We cannot deny the existence of such secondary units or produced individuals (Avayavins).

Porosity of the Discrete Sensible

Secondly, we know, that sensible things of limited magnitude are never absolutely solid.¹¹ On the contrary, they are and must be, porous; otherwise They could not be operated upon by heat,’¹² which, in order to transform a thing completely as it can do, must enter into every part of it. This entire transformation of a thing would be impossible if there were any parts of the tiling, as that thing, which were absolutely solid, as such a part would resist penetration by heat.

We also know that things can be compressed. This again would be impossible if they were absolutely solid. We must, therefore, admit that sensible things are porous. That is to say, they are composed of ultimate parts which are not absolutely contiguous but have spaces between them.

Principles governing the Structure of the Secondary Unit of Avayavin

These facts, then, may be laid down as two of the most fundamental principles in regard to the composition of sensible things of limited magnitude, namely:—

(1) A number of separate things can produce a single unit or a secondary individual which is other than, and different from, a mere aggregate. And they do it by a process of unification which is and must be different from that of mere combination; and,
(2) The ultimate particles of any thing, so produced, as particles of that thing, stand, not contiguously, but apart from one another.

Applying these principles, we can see how things of no magnitude can produce a single thing, i.e., a secondary unit, of limited magnitude.

Production of Things with Magnitude by Things with no Magnitude

First,¹³ we can see how a thing, which is a single unit, having magnitude, that is to say, some length, breadth and thickness, however minute, can be produced by a number, which must not be less than three, of other things of the nature of pure lines, that is, having only length.¹⁴

Let three brings of the nature of lines stand, not contiguously, in which case they will produce only a line, nor in the same plane, but apart from one another, and on two planes, say as—

Then let them combine by the process of unification. They will then produce the single unit,

that is to say, the prism A, which will be a thing with magnitude.
Next we can see how each of the lines producing the prism A can itself, as a single unit, be produced, in the same way, by a number, not less than two, of things of the nature of pure points, that is to say, without any magnitude whatever—without any length breadth or thickness.¹⁵

Let two things of the nature of points stand, not contiguously, in which case they will produce only a point, but apart from one another, as—
. .
and then let them combine by the process of unification. As a result of this combination we shall get the single unit
____A,
which, as a single unit, will be a thing of the nature of a pure line.

Thus, we find how things of the nature of pure points can produce things of the nature of pure lines; and these latter again, things having magnitude. That is to say, we see how things of no magnitude can produce things with magnitudes.

And this is the third way of producing things having magnitude.

The other two ways, as we have seen, are processes whereby things with magnitude are produced by things already having magnitude.

Things Like Points as the Simplest of Factors. These are Paramanus.

Finally, as things of no magnitude, i.e., of the nature of points, are the simplest and cannot be conceived as consisting of any component parts, we must hold that they cannot be produced. Therefore, if they exist, they must exist eternally; for, being unproduced, they cannot be destroyed either, destruction meaning division into component parts.¹⁶ These things are called Paramanus.

How Paramanus Must Exist and Are the Ultimate Constituents of the Discrete Sensible

We have said that, if they exist, then Paramanus must be eternal, as they cannot be conceived as being produced, and, therefore as capable of destruction.¹⁷ The next point we have to consider is that they do and must exist; and that they alone are the bases and originating ingredients of all sensible things which are discrete.

For we have seen that all sensible things which are discrete are composed of parts; and as they are composed of parts, these parts must ultimately be no other than the Paramanus. For there is no reason to suppose that the ultimate parts must be things of some magnitude, however minute—of some length, breadth and thickness. It would indeed be necessary to stop at parts having some magnitude, however minute, and regard them as ultimate, if we saw no way of things with magnitude being produced by things without magnitude. But we have shown how things with magnitude can be produced from things with no magnitude. We might also stop at the smallest things having magnitude, if the production of these, from things without magnitude, were in violation of any of the principles which rule the production of other single units. But we have seen, that not only is there no violation of such principles, but it is by virtue of those very principles that things without magnitude can possibly produce things with magnitude.

On the contrary, if there is any violation of principles, and arbitrariness, even inconsistency, anywhere, it is to be found, not in the idea of Paramanus, but in the view which regards the ultimate constituents of the sensible and discrete things as particles with magnitude.

Such particles are a violation of a principle, inasmuch as they, being of limited magnitude, are yet considered unbreakable into simpler parts; while all other sensible things having also limited magnitude are recognised as produced and capable of being broken up into simpler components.¹⁸ | ¹⁹

Then, they cannot be considered to be the simplest things, as they consist of surfaces, lines and points. Finally, if the ultimate constituents of sensible things were composed of solid, hard and extended particles with magnitude, however small, then Akasha or Ether could not really be all-pervading as we shall see it must be.²⁰

For all these reasons, we must conclude that the ultimate factors of the discrete things of sense-perception are of the measure of pure points, without any magnitude whatever, that is, without any length, breadth or thickness. They are in other words Paramanus.

Paramanus are super-sensible.

As they are without any magnitude whatever, the Paramanus, as such, can never be perceived by the senses.²¹ They are, therefore, super-sensible or transcendental (Atindriya). They are super-sensible, not in the sense that, while they are too small to be perceived by the unassisted senses, or with the aid of any instruments which have been so far invented, they could be perceived by the senses if we had, let us say, ideally perfect instruments to aid us in our sense-observation. They are super-sensible, rather, in the sense, that they can never be perceived by the senses, not even with the aid of the most perfect instruments imaginable. That is to say, they lie altogether beyond the range of the senses and are transcendental. They are beyond the range of the senses in the same sense as colour is beyond the range of hearing, or sound, of sight. They can be conceived only by the Mind.²²

Paramanus are non-spatial.

As Realities without any magnitude, the Paramanus must also be non-spatial.²³ That is to say, they themselves cannot occupy space or localised position (Pradeshatita).

No Distinction in Paramanus in Regard to Measure of any kind. How can they be Classified.

Being super-sensible and non-spatial entities, they are incapable of any distinction from one another in regard to size, shape, weight, density or any other form of measure. They can, therefore, never be classified with reference to any of these standards. But they are not incapable of classification. They can be classified with reference to certain qualities which they produce in the different forms of sensible things that are themselves the products of Paramanus.

If all sensible things of limited magnitude are produced by the Paramanus, as they must be, then it is obvious that the properties, which sensible things possess, are also produced by them, and are inherent in the things themselves.

Qualities Inherent in Things

For, if external things exist, as they must exist, independently of the percipient²⁴ then it is unreasonable to say, that their properties do not inhere in them but in the percipients; or that only some of the properties are inherent in them, while others are purely subjective.²⁵ For, it can be shown that the very arguments, which will prove that some of the properties are objective, will also prove that the rest are equally so. Granting that the external and sensible world exists, we cannot consistently maintain that any of its properties are subjective.²⁶ At best we can say that our perceptions of the properties are mere copies, perhaps very imperfect copies. But copies always imply originals. Therefore, we must admit that if the sensible world exists independently of the percipient, it has also properties which are inherent in it.

General qualities of matter.

Of these properties, there are some which are never absent from anyone of the sensible things—impenetrability, for instance. It is impossible to conceive any of the perceptible things as entirely devoid of these, unless they be hallucinations, and therefore entirely subjective. These may be and are, indeed, called the ‘general properties' (Samanya Gunas) of sensible things. One distinguishing feature they all have in common is, that they can be perceived by more senses than one. Also, in regard to masses of things, they differ only in degree but not in kind. One mass is more impenetrable than another, more easily ponderable than another, softer or harder than another, and so on. They correspond to a certain extent to what are called, in modern European Philosophy, since the days of Locke, the Primary qualities of matter. We shall refer to them simply as ‘general qualities.’

Special Qualities of Matter.

As distinguished from these, there are certain other properties, which can each be perceived by a single sense only;²⁷ and they differ, in masses of things, not in degree only, but in kind. That is to say, they are essentially different from one another. They form part of those qualities which are called the ‘special qualities’ in the Vaisheshika, and correspond to some of the secondary qualities mentioned in Western Philosophy. They are only four in number, namely:—

(1) Odour,
(2) Flavour,
(3) Luminosity (colour), and
(4) Temperature (Sparsha).²⁸ | ²⁹

It will be noticed that one quality, namely Sound, which is also perceived by a single and special sense, has been left out of consideration here. For reasons to be explained later, Sound cannot be regarded as a property of the discrete sensible things. For our present purpose it will be quite sufficient to say that there is no discrete sensible thing from which Sound cannot be entirely eliminated; that is to say, which cannot be conceived as absolutely silent. Sound can no doubt be produced by means of every one of the sensible forms of things, and may, for this reason and in this sense, be said to be common to them all; but at the same time there is no sensible thing, which cannot exist without it.

However this may be, there is one feature which is common to Sound as well as to the four properties named above, namely, that they are each perceived by a single and special sense only. They, in this respect, differ from the above-mentioned general or primary properties, and may, as distinguished from the latter, be, and indeed they are, called the ‘special properties’ of the sensible. They correspond, it is obvious, to the secondary qualities of Locke and modern European Philosophy. We shall refer to them as Special Qualities.

Of the five special qualities belonging to the sensible world, Sound, for the reason just hinted at, need not be taken into consideration now. In regard to the remaining four, it is obvious that they are all essentially different from one another. We cannot speak of flavour as being only a higher or lower degree of odour; of odour as only colour in a different degree; or of temperature as colour in a varying grade.

Nor will it do to say that these qualities are purely subjective,³⁰ that is, they exist in the percipient only and not in the things perceived, and that the primary qualities alone are inherent in matter. For, as stated before, this position is untenable, If some are regarded as objective, the rest can also be shown to be exactly on the same footing, and by the same line of reasoning; or if some are thought to be subjective, the rest must also share the same fate for exactly the same reasons.³¹ This latter position, however, of regarding every property of the sensible world, as subjective, can be held only by an Idealist Philosopher, because he denies the existence of an external world, independent of, and apart from, thoughts and ideas which are regarded as part and parcel of an experiencing subject or subjects. But as, for reasons stated before, this view of an external and sensible world not existing independently of and apart from an experiencer or experiencers, cannot be accepted as valid, and, as an alternative, we must admit the existence of the sensible, we must also admit that the secondary or special qualities are as objective as the primary or general ones. The four qualities, therefore, mentioned above must be held as objective, and inherent in the things perceived.

Classification of the Paramanus with Reference to the Special Properties of Matter.

Of these two classes of properties of sensible things, the Paramanus can be classified, only with reference to the four special qualities which differ from one another not merely in degree but essentially; and which, unlike the general qualities, are not all present in everything sensible. And the way to classify the Paramanus with reference to these qualities is as follows:—

Classification of Sensible Matter

It is well known that there are many things from „which odour can never be eliminated as long as they exist as those things and do not change into some other things which are essentially different.³² It belongs to their very essence. While, as a distinctive quality, it is inalienable from this class of things, it is not essential to many others, from which it can be easily eliminated. We might take our example of this class of things indifferently from what are called chemical elements or from other ‘compounds.’ For from the standpoint of Hindu Philosophy they are all compounds—both the chemical elements as well as what are regarded as products of the latter. For chemical atoms of elements, as well as other things, are of limited magnitude. And nothing that has any magnitude whatever, excepting infinite magnitude, can be simple. Thus while we might point to anything having inalienable odour as an example of this class, I shall simply mention such a thing as ‘musk.’ This substance can never be imagined as without odour, as long as it remains ‘musk,’ while the pure aerial atmosphere, or absolutely pure water, need not have any odour at all.

Then again, there are things from which flavour can never be absolutely eliminated,³³ (so long as they remain as those things in regard to their essential formation), while it is not so inalienable in the case of many others. There are, for instance, many juicy things which are never without flavour, while the pure air of our previous example is flavourless.

Similarly, it is inconceivable that the substance of the sun and the stars can be absolutely without luminosity, unless it undergoes complete change and transformation.³⁴ Luminosity or colour is of the very essence of such substances, while there are many other things which have no such inalienable self-luminous property.

Finally, while odour, flavour and luminosity are each inalienable in one or other form of matter, they are entirely accidental to pure air. While pure air can be easily divested of odour and flavour, and is colourless, that is, without self-luminosity, it is inconceivable without temperature.³⁵ Temperature belongs to its very essence.

There is, as stated before, no form of sensible matter with which Sound is for ever and inalienably present. Sound can no doubt be produced by all forms of sensible matter. But it is not inalienably, and always, present with any, as the four other qualities are.

Thus we find that all sensible and compound matter, with reference to the four inalienable qualities, can be divided into four great classes.

(1) That form of sensible and compound matter from which all other special qualities, such as odour, flavour and colour can be eliminated, but not temperature, which is essential to it.
(2) That from which luminosity can never be eliminated and to which it is essential.
(3) That from which flavour cannot be eliminated, and to which it is essential.
(4) That from which odour can never be eliminated and to which it is essential.

Of course, this does not mean that compounds of succeeding classes do not possess the essential and inalienable qualities of the preceding ones.³⁶ They may, and indeed do, possess them. Thus, for instance, things of the fourth class have always some temperature while they can certainly be visible, i.e., can have colour or luminosity, and can be tasted under suitable conditions. What is meant by classifying them in the above fashion is, that in each class there is only one special quality which is inalienable, and that the class possesses it, either as the sole special quality (as in the first), or as a quality which, being inalienable, is also peculiar to the class (as in the remaining three).

Technical and Symbolical Names of the Four Classes of Sensible Matter

Of these four classes, the first is to be found most abundantly, as is evident, in the atmosphere of pure air. This class of sensible matter (compound and produced matter, of course, and not a chemical element) is therefore technically and symbolically called Air (Vayu), meaning thereby only a form of matter from which all other sensible special qualities can be eliminated, but not temperature.

The second class is met with most abundantly in the fiery substance of the sun and stars. It is therefore technically and symbolically called Fire (Tejah).

As the flavour of a really objective thing is had only when it is dissolved into a liquid or watery form,—if it is not already so,—the third class of sensible matter is technically and symbolically called Water (Ap.)

Finally, the solid earth, with all its various flowers, fruits, vapours and so on, being a great storehouse of things to which odour is both essential and distinctive, the fourth class is technically and symbolically called Earth (Prithivi).

We may perhaps retain the original Sanskrit terms for these four classes of sensible matter. But if their English equivalents must be used, then they may perhaps be translated as follows: —
(1) Thermal matter;
(2) Self-luminous matter;
(3) Flavoury matter; and
(4) Odoriferous matter.

Misunderstanding in Regard to Hindu Conception of Sensible Matter

As there has been much misunderstanding in the West as to the exact notion which the Hindus have in regard to these four classes of extended matter, (the misunderstanding being greatly due to the mistranslation, by the word elements, of the general name which is given to them, namely, Bhutas), it may be well to emphasise here that they are all compound and produced forms of matter. The Hindus never looked upon any of these as an indivisible substance, or as elements in the Western chemical sense of the word. The Paramanus are the only indivisible elements, if elements they must be called, by which the four classes of discrete sensible matter, having limited magnitude, are produced.

How Paramanus Must Also be of Four Classes

And, as these are the only forms of sensible matter of limited magnitude, and as there are no others which can be distinguished from them by any other special and essentially different characteristic which is peculiar to itself, it must be held that the Paramanus themselves, out of which the four classes of sensible matter are produced, are also of four, and only four, classes.³⁷

How this is so can perhaps be illustrated as follows: Suppose there are only four spectra of colours. Of these, let us suppose again, the first three, in addition to other colours, contain respectively bands of black, of red and of blue as their essential and distinctive features, and the fourth contains nothing but yellow. Then suppose, that these four are colours which are essentially different from one another, so that none can be derived from the others; and finally, that there are no other kinds of essentially different colours in any of the four spectra. Such a group of spectra can be possible, only if there are four essentially different classes or types of factors, (vibrations or stimuli as they would be called in this case), which can originate such essentially different colours. Similarly, it must be admitted that the Paramanus, which produce the four special and essentially different qualities in sensible matter, are and can be of four classes only. They may be named as follows: —

(1) The Paramanus producing inalienable temperature but no other special qualities.
(2) Paramanus producing inalienable colour, or luminosity, (with some temperature, of course, because all luminous things must have some sort of temperature).
(3) Paramanus producing inalienable flavour (with some temperature, and colour, i.e. visibility under suitable conditions).
(4) Paramanus producing inalienable odour (with some temperature and colour and flavour, i.e., visibility and tastability under suitable conditions).

Or, with reference to the particular classes of sensible things themselves, they are spoken of as:—
(1) The Vayu-Paramanus, which enter into the composition of, and originate temperature in Vayu or the aerial atmosphere.
(2) The Tejah-Paramanus, which originate luminosity in all self-luminous things.
(3) The Ap-Paramanus, which originate flavour in all compounds which have only flavour but no odour.
(4) The Pfithivi-Paramanus, which originate odour in compounds having odour.

What is Really Different in Different Classes of Paramanus.

These different classes of Paramanus are different from one another, it may be repeated, not in weight or any other measure, but only in their capacity to produce the four special qualities in those various sensible things which are of limited magnitude and which, as such, are themselves but Paramanus in compound forms. In fact the four classes of Paramanus are even what may be called Forces, Powers or Stimuli which produce all that affects our senses as things of limited magnitude possessing, among others, the four special properties of temperature, and so on. Only, the Paramanus are things which are real because they are self-subsisting and cannot be conceived as originating from something else. They are real and self-subsisting Forces or Stimuli—if one may call them so. It may also be repeated that while, as compounds, the Pararnanus produce things of limited magnitude and their qualities affecting our senses, they themselves, i.e., as simple and uncompounded factors, are for ever super-sensible, as they must be, on account of their having no magnitude whatever.

No Sub-Class in Paramanu

It might perhaps be said here that, if the Pararnanus can be divided into four classes with reference to the four special qualities they originate,³⁸ they can also be considered as having a much larger variety on account of the varieties which there are in each of the four special qualities themselves.³⁹ This would indeed be so, if the varieties of a special quality were different essentially from one another. But they are not. Indeed, that they are but varieties of one special quality, points to the fact that they must all have a single common basis, just as the varieties of colour in the solar spectrum have one common source which is the light of the sun. Moreover, we see that the same temperature, colour, flavour and odour may appear as a different shade or variety, either to the same person under different conditions, or to different persons under the same conditions. But a colour can never lose its character as colour to be perceived as temperature or as flavour. And this is so, because while temperature, colour, flavour and odour are different from one another in essence, different shades or varieties of one and the same special quality are but the results of one and the same kind of essential factors, that is, Paramanus.

There are, therefore, only four classes of Paramanus; and each of the four classes is, in itself, entirely without any other variety. Each of them may be said to be the general form of all the varieties of a single class. There are, in other words, no minor divisions or classes in a general class of Paramanus.

How Paramanus Originate the Corresponding Senses

Finally, each of the four classes of Paramanus, as the origin of a special quality perceived by a single special sense, is also the origin of the particular sense itself.⁴⁰ That is to say, the four classes of Paramanus produce respectively:—

(i) The Temperature-Sense,⁴¹
(ii) Sight,
(iii) Taste, and
(iv) Smell.

That they do so may be supported by the following arguments:—

Each of the special senses reveals to us only a single quality and none other.⁴² And it reveals to us only that quality which it can itself produce, that is to say, which it possesses as a capacity and in a pre-eminent degree. That a special sense, revealing a single quality, has that quality as a capacity in abundance, or, which is the same thing, has the capacity of producing that quality, can be very easily ascertained by exciting the various sense-organs. Thus, for instance, excitations of the optic nerve by artificial means will produce colour, that is to say, a form of luminosity. But the capacity to produce a particular special quality on the part of a thing, simply means that the latter is made up of Paramanus of a particular kind. For it is only the Paramanus of a particular class which alone, as we have seen, constitute the capacity to produce a special quality of a particular kind. Therefore, a special sense, having the capacity to produce a single special quality, and thus revealing exclusively that quality, must be made up of Paramanus which alone constitute such a capacity.

Thus it is established that the four senses, namely,

(i) The Temperature-sense,
(ii) Sight,
(iii) Taste, and
(iv) Smell,

are made up respectively of Paramanus producing in the sensible

(i) Temperature,
(ii) Luminosity,
(iii) Flavour, and
(iv) Odour.

The above argument is given almost in the very words of the old Nyaya and VaishesMka works. But the idea is really very simple. It is only this:—

The special senses are essentially of the same nature as the essential ingredients or originators of the qualities themselves. And the truth and justice of this idea will be at once apparent, if we substitute for Paramanus, special kinds of stimuli; and regard them as real facts of nature, corresponding to the excitations in ourselves. If it is true that there are different kinds of stimuli in, nature for the different sensations produced in us, and that these sensations are so produced by corresponding excitations of our nervous system, there is also truth in the Nyaya-Vaisheshika idea that the senses in man are essentially of the same nature as the essential ingredients or originators of the qualities which are perceived by means of them.

Paramanus Produce the Discrete Sensible.

Thus, we find, that all objects of limited magnitude in the sensible world, with their various qualities, as well as the four special senses by which we perceive them, are produced by the Paramanus, which are the essential Realities in them.

The sense of hearing by which sound is perceived and the faculties of touching and handling and so on, which constitute the other characteristics of living bodies, have been left out of consideration here. What they are and how they are produced, according to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika, will be seen later on.

So far, then, with regard to the Paramanus, or the first four classes of ultimate Realities, which are taught by the Realistic system.

Footnotes

YOU MAY ALSO LIKE