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Jagadish Chandra Chatterji
Hindu Realism
Appendix A.
My very dear and philosophic friend, Mr. B. Keightley, M.A. (Cantab.), Bar-at-law, to whom I am most grateful for going through the proofs of this volume as well as for several suggestions and much valuable criticism, has written as follows:—
“The Adrishta or Moral merit and demerit attaching to the Atmans imply necessarily some standard or definite criterion and scale of morality. Now it is universally accepted in modern philosophic discussion in the West, that morality (of any kind or order) can only arise in a ‘society’ of conscious interacting beings, it being held and granted by all that morality is through and through a social thing. The only possible alternative (now abandoned mostly) being that morality is determined by the Will of a personal God.
“Now as Atmans are everlasting and Adrishta attaches to them per se and not as the result of any fiat of a personal God: How does the moral element come in and what is the moral standard, the moral criterion? And how can there be any such in respect of Atmans which (in Hindu Realism) do not apparently possess self-consciousness as such, nor are they spoken of as ultimately ‘forming a society’?
“At least the point raised ought to be noticed, I think, however briefly.”
It is not only this one question but several others also which have been left out of consideration in this essay which is intended to be but a short introduction to only the metaphysics of the system. Still as the point has been raised, it may just briefly be touched upon as suggested by my friend. Of course, anything like a full discussion of the question is quite impossible here, as it touches upon the whole subject of Ethical philosophy from the Hindu point of view. Briefly, then, the Hindu ideas in this respect may be stated as follows:—
(a) The Hindu philosopher would be disposed to agree with the Western thinker in saying ‘that morality is through and through a social thing,’ but with an important reservation, viz.:—
That while morality is a social thing, moral conduct (including both action and thoughts and feelings) has, from the Hindu point of view, for its real objective not ‘others’ but oneself whom it is intended to benefit primarily, any benefit accruing from such conduct to ‘others’ being only secondary and incidental, even though inevitable because, from the Hindu point of view, no conduct can be for the real and true and absolute benefit of oneself unless it is also beneficial—at any rate harmless—to ‘others.’
The idea that one is leading a ‘moral’ or virtuous life solely for the benefit of ‘others’ is, from the Hindu point of view, a pure delusion. From their standpoint no conduct is ‘moral’ or ‘virtuous’ which has solely ‘others’ as its objective. If or when such conduct is possible, it ceases to be moral. If anything, it then becomes super-moral. For it is possible only when a being has reached a stage in his existence wherein he can be himself affected neither by the doing of a moral act (whether an actual performance or merely in thought and feeling) nor by its omission; that is to say, when he has realised Moksha or true and final Freedom and Independence. Short of that stage, moral conduct’ is essential and absolutely necessary for an experiencing being—necessary, because if he does not follow it he will harm himself by ‘degrading’ his nature and by bringing about his fall from the ‘moral’ height where he may have reached, if not by checking his further advancement. It is really with this thought, however secretly and sub-consciously cherished in one’s heart, of avoiding the risk of ‘degradation’ on one’s own part, if not of positively retarding one’s moral and spiritual status, that all beings below the Moksha stage endeavour to lead a moral life.
The real objective of ‘moral conduct’ therefore, is one’s own self.
(b) This being the nature of ‘moral conduct’ from the Hindu point of view, ‘morality,’ i.e., Dharma, may be defined (as has been hinted above, and as is indeed done by the Vaisheshika) as the conduct,— including both outward actions and thinking and feeling,—which makes for the advancement of an experiencing entity in the scale of existence in specific forms, or which ultimately leads to (or serves as an intermediate means of realising) absolute Freedom, i.e., Moksha (Yato’ bhyudaya-nihshreyasasiddhihsa dharmah; Vaish. Su., I. i. 2.)
(c) Under these circumstances, the moral element comes in the fact that an experiencing being may or may not follow such a line of conduct as would make for its progress upward in the scale of beings, or would conduce to the acquisition of that direct experience of the truth of the real nature of things which enables one to realise Freedom. If he does not follow such conduct then there is degradation and suffering for him,—degradation and suffering which are, on the one hand, brought about, in virtue of Samavaya, as the inevitable consequences (either immediately or when opportunity offers, the consequences abiding in the meantime as Adrishta or potential worth) of violating the Dharma, i.e., the rules of moral conduct at any given stage and occasion; and, on the other, teach the experiencer the necessity of not violating the Dharma again, the lessons thus taught being noted down and retained as indelible Samskaras, not so much in the surface consciousness as in the innermost depths of the Soul (in the subliminal or subconscious Self, in the language of modern Western thought).
(d) And the Moral Standard is furnished by the Universal Experience of the past, retained as the Universal Wisdom or the Veda by the being or beings in the higher and highest specific forms of existence, i.e., by Brahma and the Rishis who, from their own experiences in the past, can, and as a matter of fact do, lay down the rules of Dharma or Moral Conduct, teaching experiencing beings how they should behave if they want to progress higher and higher in the scale of specific forms of existence or to realise Freedom—teaching them how they should avoid harming others (though for their own sakes), how they should not tell lies, i.e., misrepresent facts and real intentions and thus mislead others; and so on, (Comp. Tad-vachanat Amnayasya pramanyam; Vaish. Su., I. i. 3 or 4).
(e) Finally, the Atmans do form a Society, indeed a hierarchy of the Universe, as shown above.
It is only when they cease finally to have embodiments, i.e., die the last of deaths after they have attained Moksha by realising, by direct experience, the truths of the essential nature of things, and thus cease to have any Adrishtas, that they cease also to be ‘social’ beings in the sense that they then have no necessity of forming part of the ‘Univeral Society.’ But then, when thus Freed, they also cease to be under any moral obligation—they become Super-moral as said before. Till then they are conscious of and experience specific things and constitute a Society of ‘Souls,’ whether incarnate in physical, bodies or discarnate but still existing as limited beings in specific forms even though these may be super-physical.
Appendix B.
Mr. Keightley suggested also that I should avoid using the words ‘Polyonymism’ and ‘ Polyonymic ’ as names of the third Standard, and I would have done so if it were not too late. But the sense in which I have used the terms is quite clear, I think, from what is said ante. In case, however, this may not be so, it may be explained here that, what I mean by Polyonymism is the doctrine which holds that what is experienced as the Universe is essentially a single, uniform Reality of the nature of pure Intelligence or Experiencing Principle, without there being in it or as part of it anything of the nature of the experienced,—this Single Reality appearing under what is but a multiplicity of names, i.e., ideas as such and ideas objectified (called respectively Nama or ‘name’ and Rupa or Form). The doctrine could be called Idealism, if these ‘names,’ which constitute the Universe when substantiated by the Reality underlying them, formed any part of the Real. This, however, is not regarded to be the case; i.e., not regarded by the typical school representing the third Standard, viz., the Vedanta, even though there are other schools belonging to this Standard which do regard the ‘Name’ (or ‘Names and Forms ’) as part of the Real.
Besides, the second Standard also is a form of Idealism, inasmuch as the material or the physical (i.e., the sensible) is regarded by it as derived from what are really of the nature of thoughts and feelings; and it would not therefore do to call the third Standard also ‘idealism.’
Appendix C.
The qualification, hinted at by the phrase “in a way only” in ‘The Method of Realisation’ chapter and explained in Note 67, owes its origin to Dr. J. E. McTaggart, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, to whom I am deeply indebted for much valuable help. In the present instance, it was he who first pointed out to me how the statement as originally made in the paragraph under reference was defective. It was then only that the qualifying phrase was introduced and the note on it written.
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