| Philosophy and Religion / J. C. Chatterji: Hindu Realism |
Jagadish Chandra Chatterji
Hindu Realism
Conclusion.
Such then is the Realism which the Hindus teach to those not capable of understanding by reasoning the psycho-dynamic or polyonymic presentation of the true nature of things. But even a candidate, not intellectually qualified or temperamentally inclined to follow the presentations of the other Standards, can reach the same goal as any others, when, by practice, he comes to realise the truths as presented by Realism.1 This goal, as said so often, is the absolute freedom and independence of the Real in man; it is freedom from all sorrow and suffering, and, above all, from every necessity and compulsion, and is gained by freeing oneself from the one and only prolific source of all other necessities,—the necessity and compulsion to be born in a specific form of existence. And he can reach this goal even without realising what may be called the secondary things, such as the ultimate nature of the Paramanus, Akasha and so on; that is to say, whether they be really eternal and everlasting or are derived things, or whether there be really many Atmans or only one.2
For, as already indicated, to realise the goal, that is, absolute freedom, all that he needs is that he should no longer be prompted to activity with a view to gain some advantage to himself as opposed to others, and, to this end, to be absolutely free from likes and dislikes, special attachment for some things and aversion for others. When these latter cease, a man no longer hankers after some things as specially desired or seeks to avoid others as undesirable. And this object is gained the moment it is realised that all the diverse forms of things, which hitherto appeared variously as beautiful or hideous, as attractive or repulsive, are but groups of Paramanus that are all alike. Suppose a man could, by an extraordinary power akin to, say, that of the ideally perfect microscope, see things so magnified that they appeared to him as nothing but a swirling mass of particles which were all alike, it is obvious he could not be specially drawn by any one of them; and ceasing to be drawn by any of them, lie would not be repelled either by others. Similarly, when a man realises by experience, and is not merely convinced by reasoning, that all perceptible things are but Paramanus which are all alike, he cannot possibly have any likes or dislikes for any of them. Once this is realised, it matters little whether he knows them further as eternally existing or as derived things.
Then again in regard to the Atman, the moment a man realises this as himself by experience, and not merely as an intellectual conviction, he ceases to have special attachment for any specilic form of embodiment, human or superhuman. And ceasing to have special attachment for any particular forms, he is not repelled by others. Thus he is again free from likes and dislikes and all that they imply. This freedom from likes and dislikes by the realisation of himself as the Atman is further strengthened by this other experience in regard to the forms of embodiments themselves, the experience, namely, that they are, like all other discrete things, themselves but masses of Paramanus, which are all alike.
Thus, by just realising oneself as the Atman, one can realise the desired end without further enquiring whether the Atman which is himself is the only one in the Universe or whether there are others. Nor will this mean any limitation to the Atman which is himself, or make any practical difference. For the Atman, being infinite in nature, and without any distinguishing features which may differentiate it from other Atmans (supposing there are such), will realise itself, as a matter of fact, as one with them all, in their character as pure Atman, i.e., as not associated with particular Adrishtas and embodiments.
Thus, without enquiring further into the ultimate character of the Paramanus, Akasha, Kala and Dik, and Manases as eternal Realities or derived things or in to the question of the oneness or plurality of Atmans, and by just realising the truths as presented by Realism, the Realist can reach the same goal as the others.
When the goal is realised, the Realist may or may not care to know what I have called secondary things. If he does, after the nine classes of Realities as taught by his own Standard are realised as existing facts, he may perhaps also know them as the other Standards teach them to be. But if he does not care to pursue his enquiries further in this direction, he may still hold these as eternal verities. But in any case, as far as the ultimate goal and main object is concerned, he gains it by following the path of Realism, just as much as those whose intellectual reasoning even did not stop at that point of the analysis of things where the nine Realities of Realism were discovered as facts. Thus Realism, like the other systems, serves the same purpose, and it has, like them, ever been studied in India as a means, an intermediate means, to the gaining of the one supreme end, namely, Absolute Freedom, i.e., Moksha or Mukti. Realism, therefore, like the other metaphysical systems of the Hindus, has a most practical aim and object in view.
THE END
Footnotes
1. On the sameness of goal of all the systems, see At. T. Viv., p. 1.
2. In regard to the necessity or otherwise of the realisation of secondary truths, see Sankh. T. L., just referred to, and Shi. Dh., pp. 58-61.
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