Philosophy and Religion / J. C. Chatterji: Hindu Realism

Jagadish Chandra Chatterji

Hindu Realism

Introductory

(a) - General

The Name Hindu Defined

The name Hindu seems only to be a corrupt form of the Sanskrit Sindhu, i.e., the Indus. It was in all Probability given by ancient Persians to those contemporaries of theirs who inhabited the provinces of India bordering on that river. Whatever the origin of the name, and however much one may dislike it personally owing to its history and associations, I must use it here; and by Hindus I shall mean all those people or peoples who accept, or did accept, that social policy and religious discipline which in Sanskrit is known as the Varnashrama Dharma and is based on the teachings of what is called the Veda—both these terms being explained later.

Hindu Philosophy Defined

By Hindu Philosophy I mean that branch of the ancient learning of the Hindus (in the above sense) which demonstrates by reasoning propositions in regard to (a) what a man ought to do, in order to gain true happiness in and under particular circumstances and in specific states of existence; or (b) what he ought to realise by direct experience, in order to be radically and absolutely freed, from suffering and to be absolutely independent—such propositions being already given, and lines of reasoning in their support being established, by duly qualified authorities, as also explained later on.¹ | ²

Sanskrit Names for Philosophy

In Sanskrit, Philosophy has been variously named; but it is at present chiefly known as Darshana Shastra, which literally means the science of views, i.e., correct views, in regard to either of the two kinds of propositions named above; namely, those embodying what a man should do to be truly happy in and under particular circumstances and in specific states, i.e., his duties (Karma or Dharma); or those enunciating the truths of the essential nature of things (Tattva), so that a man by realising them may be absolutely free and independent.

It is also called Vichara-Shastra or Manana-Shastra, both these terms meaning the “Science of Rational Demonstration,” namely, of propositions put forward in regard to either duty (Karma or Dharma) or essential truths (Tattva).³ | ⁴

It may be said to correspond to what in the West, that is, Europe and America, is generally understood by Philosophy, in so far as the latter is only a rational demonstration of what a man should do to truly better himself, or of ultimate verities which are already realised by experience as facts; that is to say, in so far as Philosophy is not mere speculation in regard to such duties and verities. The full meaning, of this qualification will be understood as we go on.

Two Main Divisions of Hindu Philosophy

From the definition given above it is obvious that Hindu Philosophy falls into two broad divisions, namely:—

(1) Rational demonstration of propositions of duty, that is to say, what a man should or should not do in order to realise happiness, in some state of specific existence.

This is called the Dharma-mimamsa or Karma-mimamsa. We shall refer to it as Dharma-mimamsa.⁵

(2) Rational demonstration of propositions in regard to those truths about the fundamental nature of things which a man should realise by direct experience, to be absolutely freed from suffering and absolutely independent.

This division may be called Tattva-mimamsa. It is also termed Moksha-Darshana.⁶ We shall call it simply Metaphysical Philosophy, and refer to the truths discussed therein as Metaphysical Truths.

While thus the two divisions are made in regard to their special subject-matter, yet the Dharma-mimamsa is not, and cannot be, entirely free from some reasoning about Metaphysical Truths. For the very propositions it has to discuss are based on these truths, one of which, the fundamental one, is discussed at some length in the main text-book of this branch of Hindu Philosophy. Several other Metaphysical Truths are taken for granted. Thus even Dharma-mimamsa has a metaphysical basis, and a particular metaphysical standpoint, the place of which we shall see presently.

Schools of Metaphysical Philosophy

As for Metaphysical Philosophy, it is represented by a number of what are called Tantras or Nayas, words which may be translated as schools, using this term in a sense which is, as will be soon seen, somewhat different from that which it usually bears in connection with Philosophy in the West.⁷

There are several of these schools, but only five are regarded as fundamental. Their names are: —
(1) Vaisheshika,
(2) Nyaya,
(3) Sankhya,
(4) Yoga, and
(5) Vedanta.

The others are regarded as, and may be easily shown to be, but variations of these five.

As is well-known, the fundamental five schools again really represent, in so far as what may be called purely theoretical truths are concerned, three systems grouped as follows:

Three Main Systems

(1) Vaisheshika-Nyaya or Nyaya-Vaisheshika,
(2) Sankhya-Yoga, and
(3) Vedanta.⁸

As stated before, the Dharma-mimamsa has a metaphysical basis of its own, and so far as this basis is concerned, it is also reckoned as belonging to the first group, namely, the Nyaya-Vaisheshika.

Thus, in reality, there are only three metaphysical systems of the Hindus. These systems again are not considered as mutually contradictory. They are regarded as forming a graduated series in which the three systems form, as it were, three great standards, suited to different types or grades of minds,—different intellectual (and only intellectual) capacities and temperaments.

Hindu Conception of Philosophy; and certain preconceptions of the Hindus

This position follows as an inevitable consequence of the very conception the Hindus have of Philosophy itself. What that conception is, has been already hinted at. It might perhaps be made a little clearer, by stating here certain ideas which are universally held by all Hindus. They may be considered the general preconceptions of the Hindu mind.⁹ But they are preconceptions for which the Hindus have reasons, that are, to them, quite full and satisfactory. Without, however, giving any of these reasons here, I shall first just state what to a Hindu, seem to be the corresponding preconceptions of the Western mind; and then just give the Hindu ones, so that the latter may be seen by opposition, as it were, in clear relief. The two sets of preconceptions are, as it will be seen, diametrically opposed to each other.

It seems to a Hindu that Western students of his Philosophy start generally with the following pre-suppositions, which are apparently assumed as established facts:—

(1) Man can never know Metaphysical Truths by direct experience, in the same way, for instance, as he can know sense objects. And, therefore, Metaphysical Truths can, at best, be but matters of speculation and mere inferences or only based on faith.
(2) Even if it be conceded, as a sort of possibility, that men may perhaps know these truths some day by direct experience, yet there has been so far no man who has known them in this fashion.
(3) Therefore, being matters of pure speculation, the various schools of Hindu philosophy, like any other speculative systems of the West, must be mutually contradictory, and if any one of them be true, the others must be false.

As against these, the Hindu preconceptions are:—¹⁰

(1) Man can know Metaphysical Truths, like any other truths, by direct experience, and not merely by speculation, by inference, or by faith.
(2) There have been men in the past who have thus known the whole truth of our nature and existence, as well as that of the Universe as a whole. These men are known as Rishis, which term, in this connection, may be translated as “perfected seers.”¹¹
(3) And, it is by knowing Metaphysical Truths by direct experience that some of the Rishis have taught them to the Hindus.

(4) But the Rishis have taught the Metaphysical Truths not as dogmas, to be received merely on faith, but by rational demonstration. That is to say, they have demonstrated by reasoning¹² the truths, already realized by them as matters of direct and positive experience.

And it is this rational demonstration of, that is, demonstrating by reasoning, the metaphysical truths, which constitutes Philosophy according to the Hindu point of view.¹³

The function of Philosophy, therefore, is not the discovery of metaphysical truths, by reasoning and inference; but only the explaining and understanding rationally of such truths already discovered and realised by experience.¹⁴

(5) These truths, being realised by the Rishis by direct experience, that is, not being conceived by them as matters of mere speculation, inference, or faith, all the Rishis have known them as the same, in much the same way as all who are provided with eyes may know the sun as one and the same thing.¹⁵

(6) But, while the metaphysical truths as realised by them are the same in every case, the Rishis have taught this one and the same set of truths, in what may be called three different standards or grades,¹⁶ which are represented by, but not necessarily exactly the same as, the great text-books known as the philosophical Sutras.¹⁷

And they have thus taught in order to suit different minds, in much the same way as, say, the grammar of Sanskrit or Greek may be taught in different standards, such as practical, historical, philological, and so on.

(7) And it is these three different standards of teaching and presenting rationally one and the same body of essential truths, already realised by the Rishis by direct experience, which constitute the three fundamental systems of Philosophy mentioned above. They are therefore not contradictory to one another, but together form a single and gradually advancing series, in which, it may be pointed out, the order of the three systems may or may not be one of historical succession.

(8) Not only are not the three different standards of Philosophy contradictory to one another, but they all lead to the same practical end.¹⁸ A man may pursue any one of them, according to his intellectual capacity and temperament, and yet reach the same practical end as others following the other standards. How this is possible may again be exemplified by our previous illustration of the different standards of the grammar of a language like Sanskrit. While what I have called the historical and philological standards of the grammar may give one a knowledge of the language respectively in its historical development and in regard to its ultimate sources, they, as well as the first standard, may give one a practical knowledge, i.e. knowledge enabling one to speak and write the language correctly, which may be exactly the same. Similarly, while the second and third standards of Philosophy may, and indeed do give one a good deal more of what may be called theoretical knowledge or knowledge of secondary importance, they, as well as the first standard, lead one to the same practical end which is the realisation of absolute freedom and independence.

That the Hindus regard their different systems as forming a gradually advancing series has not been entirely unknown in the West. It was known, in a more or less confused manner, even to Fred. von Schlegel.¹⁹ Recently the late Prof. Max Muller came to realise it in a fashion, in so far as he recognised the one fundamental basis of all the schools of Hindu Philosophy. He says:—

“The longer I have studied the various systems, the more have I become impressed with the truth of the view taken by Vijnana-Bhikshu and others that there is behind the variety of the six systems a common fund of what may be called national or popular philosophy, a large Manasa lake of philosophical thought and language, far away in the distant North, and in the distant Past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes.”²⁰

While thus the idea is not entirely unknown among European scholars of Sanskrit, there has been no adequate attempt made, so far as I know, by any writer to show how exactly, if at all, the different systems can constitute a single and gradually advancing series, or how the Hindus can at all justify their position. Yet the Hindus maintain that it can be justified, and that the view they hold of their Philosophy is not only correct, but is most essential to a proper understanding of their various systems.

Leaving aside, for future consideration, this claim of the Hindus and taking the position for granted, let us now see what the three standards really are.

(b) - The Three Standards

The Sanskrit word for what I have called a Standard of Philosophy is Prasthana. Literally translated it means a setting forth, or a setting out. It may also be rendered as a standpoint or road. And, as stated above, there are three and only three standards or Prasthanas.

The Creationist or Realistic Standard

The first standard is meant either for absolute beginners, that is to say, for students with an intelligent, but as yet philosophically unreflecting, or at any rate not much reflecting, mind; or for those otherwise unable or unwilling to study any but the practical truths of metaphysical Philosophy.²¹ This standard takes up the Universe as it appears to such a mind, that is to say, as it is found extended in space and changing in time, with all the objects in it as real things and all the qualities of these objects as inherent in them and not as something subjective, existing merely in the mind of the percipient. It excludes, of course, anything of the nature of what may be called the psycho-dynamism or polyonymism²² of the other two standards and has certainly nothing to do with idealism. It is naive realism, pure and simple. As Realism, this standard has reduced the infinite complexity of things to nine classes of ultimate Realities. The reduction of the infinite variety of existing and experienced things to these nine classes may be called the analysis or analytic aspect of the Universe from this standpoint.

Then, what may be called the synthetic aspect of the Universe, as taught in this standard, shows how, out of these nine classes of ultimate Realities, everything that wo experience in the Universe is formed. These things, which are thus formed out of the ultimate Realities, are considered as absolutely new productions. They are no doubt produced out of certain ingredients which have existed from all eternity; but, before their production, they have no sort of existence whatever. They might be spoken of as absolute creations, if it were not for the fact that they are produced, not out of nothing, but out of things which have been eternally existing. And this is a point which should be borne clearly in mind; for it is with reference to this idea, that the standard takes its name, which, in Sanskrit, is Arambha-vada or Asat-karya-vada. The first of these two names can be translated as The doctrine of an absolutely new creation’ out of pre-existing ingredients; while the second means The doctrine of absolute nonexistence of the produced’ before their actual production. For the sake of convenience we shall call it the ‘creationist standard’ or standpoint, bearing always in mind, that creation in this connection means, not the creating of things out of nothing, but only forming and fashioning them out of previously existing factors.

As suggested before, there are three main and original schools, started by Rishis, which belong to this standard or standpoint.²³ Of these, the Dharma-mimamsa belongs to it only in so far as it has a metaphysical basis and a metaphysical conception of the origin of things; otherwise it deals chiefly with certain propositions laid down in regard to men’s duties. The second school belonging to it, that is, the Nyaya, takes practically for granted several of the metaphysical doctrines, which are special to the standard, and then devotes itself very largely to the discussion of the proper means of arriving at truth, in so far as this means consists of reasoning.²⁴ While the third school of this standard, the Vaisheshika, deals chiefly with the metaphysical doctrines themselves. Thus, while the two first-named schools may be spoken of as rather practical, the third is, in a sense, more theoretical; and as my object here is to deal chiefly with the theoretical doctrines, I shall often refer to this standard by the name of its third representative, namely, Vaisheshika, except when there will be occasion specially to mention the other members.

I shall also speak of it as Realism, Realistic Standard, and so on.

The Psycho-dynamic Standard.

The second standard takes up the analysis of the Universe at the point where it was left by the Vaisheshika, and carries it further. It reduces the nine ultimate Realities, or entities of the Realistic System, to only two. It does not discard the nine Realities altogether but only shows that they are not final. It accepts them as facts but points out that they are not primary but are derived from still simpler principles.²⁵ | ²⁶ That is to say, it does with the Realities of the first standard, very much what the latest physical researches in the West are said to be doing with the atoms of matter with which Western chemistry deals. The tendency of these researches has been, as is well-known, to show that the atoms of chemistry are not ultimate Realities, but that they are derived from sources that are more simple and more universal. But while they are tending in this direction, they have not in any way interfered with the existence of atoms as definite units, albeit they are not final Realities.

The reduction of the nine Realities of the first standard to what are regarded as the two ultimate principles may be called the analytic aspect of the Universe, as held by the second standard, corresponding to the analytic aspect of the former. The second standard also possesses a synthetic aspect which in all essentials is exactly the same as that of the first, only it shows, as is natural, that the derived things are produced not from the nine Realities but from the two which it considers ultimate. Of course, it presents the synthetic aspect in greater detail and in a somewhat fuller form.

It shows how one of the two classes of ultimate Realities remains for ever unaffected and unchanged while out of the other is produced everything which can ever form an object of experience. It shows also how out of this Reality are first produced all those things or facts which are regarded as mental or psychical, such as thoughts, ideas, feelings, and so on, and then out of these again everything material.

There has been much confusion in the West as to the exact nature of this standard. It derives the material from the mental and psychical, that is to say, from things which are of the nature of thoughts, ideas, and feelings. But, in spite of this fact, Prof. Garbe, who is perhaps the one scholar in the West who has made a thorough study of the literature of this standard, has yet taken it to be a form of materialism; so much so, that he has seen no place for psychology in this standard and has substituted a physiology in its stead.²⁷ This is indeed strange not only because it is absolutely against the universal tradition of the Hindus, but also because it is absurd to call a system of Philosophy materialistic which derives matter from thoughts and ideas. Prof. Max Muller, however, who generally had a better insight into things Hindu came to form a clearer and more correct conclusion as to the nature of the standard. For he recognised in it a system of idealism;²⁸ and if a system that derives matter from things mental can be called idealism, it undoubtedly is so. But more properly perhaps it may be spoken of as a psycho- dynamism, inasmuch as the principles which it regards as the origin of things are both psychical, i.e. of the nature of feelings, thoughts and ideas, and dynamic, i.e., of the nature of forces or powers.

Being a system of psycho-dynamism it discards the creationist notion of the Vaisheshika, and shows that things are not formed out of pre-existing materials, as absolutely new creations, but that products already exist in a potential form in the original psycho-dynamic principle. They simply unroll themselves out from this potential state as a tree unrolls itself out from the seed. That is to say, from this point of view, things are not created but evolved; and what is evolved already exists in a potential state. Therefore it is called Parinama-vada. This may be translated as the doctrine of evolution; and the standard may be called the evolutionist standard. It is also called Sat-karya-vada, that is to say, the doctrine of the existence of the product in a potential form prior to its actual manifestation.

There are, as mentioned before, two main schools, founded by Rishis, belonging to this standard; namely, (1) Sankhya and (2) Yoga.

The Sankhya devotes itself chiefly to the exposition of the doctrines of the standard while the Yoga occupies itself mostly with the consideration of the practical method by which the truths of the doctrines can be realised as direct experiences. I shall, therefore, refer to this standard as Sankhya, mentioning Yoga only where it is necessary.

The Polyonymy Standard

The final standard takes up the analysis of the Universe at the point at which it was left by the evolutionist standard; and reduces the two Realities of the latter to one absolute Reality only. Like the second in its dealings with the first, the third or final standard does not entirely discard the findings of the second; only it shows how one of the two Realities recognised by the Sankhya cannot be absolutely real, but that it is a something which, while it is real from one point of view, is for ever non-existent when looked at from another.

This is what it gives as the analytic aspect of the Universe; but it presents a synthetic aspect too, which is practically the same as that taught in the other standards, with such differences only as follow inevitably from the analytic view it presents.

As the Reality it teaches is absolutely unchangeable, this standard shows how the Universe, with its infinite variety, is and must be but an appearance, namely, of mere ‘names and forms,’ i.e., concepts as such and concepts objectified. That is to say, it shows how it is one and the same thing which, remaining what it is, yet appears as many, under many names and concepts. It may, therefore, be called a standard of polyonymism. In Sanskrit it is called Vivarta-vada, that is to say, the doctrine of production in which the originating Reality remains what it is and yet brings about the result. It is also called Sat-karana-vada²⁹ that is to say, the doctrine of the reality of only the originating source or basis of things. We shall call it polyonymism,³⁰ as it is not exactly idealism in any Western sense of the word that I know of. The manifold of the Universe, according to this standard, no doubt consists only of ideas as such and ideas objectified —of “names and forms” as they are called—which are, as it were, backed up and made substantial by the one and only Reality; but these ideas, while forming, from one point of view, an eternal series, are, under no circumstances, part of the one and absolute Reality.³¹

It is represented, as stated above, by the Vedanta, by which name we shall refer also to this standard.

Scope and method of the presentation of Hindu Philosophy here made.

Of these three standards or systems of Hindu Philosophy, the last two only are chiefly known in the West. For this, we are greatly indebted to Sanskrit scholars. The first, as it seems to me, has received but scant attention, at any rate, much less attention than it perhaps really deserves.

It is, therefore, my purpose here to make an attempt at explaining the main and original doctrines of this hitherto neglected school of Hindu Realism in such a fashion as to make it intelligible to the Western student.

In making this attempt I shall first state the doctrines as clearly as I can and then give some of the reasonings which are adduced in their support.

Footnotes

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