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The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila
Book V
a. The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is begun a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the primâ facie notions of others in regard to his Institute. Among those, in the first place he disposes of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression 'Well,' in the first Aphorism [of Book I.], is purposeless:
Reasons for a Benedictory Opening.
1. The [use of a] Benediction [is justified] by the practice of the good, by our seeing its fruit, and by Scripture.
a. The [use of a] Benediction, which we made, is proved to be proper to be made, by these proofs; such is the meaning. The word iti is intended to preclude the expectation of any other reasons.
b. He repels those who entertain the primâ facie view, that what was asserted in the expression, 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord' [see Book I., Aph. 92], is not made out; because [forsooth,] his existence is proved by his being the giver of the fruits of works:1
Needlessness of a Lord.
2. Not from its [the world's,] being governed by a Lord is there the effectuation of fruit: for it is by works [i.e., by merit and demerit,] that this is accomplished.
a. That is to say: it is not proper [to suppose] the effectuation of the change [of the elements] into the shape of the [appropriate] fruit of works, on the ground that the cause is 'governed by a Lord;' because it is possible for the fruit to be effected by the works [i.e., the merit and demerit,] alone, which are indispensable; [and, if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, he cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].2
b. He declares, further, in [several] aphorisms, that it is not the case that the Lord is the giver of fruit:
The supposed Lord would be selfish.
3. [If a Lord were governor, then] from intending his own benefit, his government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.
a. If the Lord were the governor, then his government would be only for his own benefit; as is the case [with ordinary rulers] in the world: such is the meaning.
b. In reply to the doubt, 'grant that the Lord, also, be benefited: what harm?' he says:
And, therefore, not the Lord spoken of.
4. [He must, then, be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of him].
a. If we agree that the Lord, also, is benefited, he, also, must be something mundane, 'just like a worldly lord;' because, since his desires are [on that supposition,] not [previously] satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.: such is the meaning.
b. In reply to the doubt, 'be it even so,' he says:
The difficulty perhaps originates in a mistaken expression.
5. Or [let the name of Lord be] technical.
a. If, whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then let yours, like ours, be merely a technical term for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation; since there cannot be an eternal lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will: such is the meaning.
b. He states another objection to the Lord's being the governor:
Objection to there being a Lord.
6. This [position, viz., that there is a Lord,] cannot be established without [assuming that he is affected by] Passion; because that is the determinate cause [of all energizing].
a. That is to say: moreover, it cannot be proved that he is a governor, unless there be Passion; because Passion is the determinate cause of activity.
b. But then, be it so, that there is Passion in the Lord, even. To this he replies:
This objection, further.
7. Moreover, were that [Pasion] conjoined with him, he could not be eternally free.
a. That is to say: moreover, if it be agreed that there is conjunction [of the Lord] with Passion, he cannot be eternally free; and, therefore, thy tenet [of his eternal freedom] is invalidated.
b. Pray [let us ask], does lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be properties of Nature, [not properties of Soul]? Or from an influence by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative:
Objection, on one branch of an alternative.
8. If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul].
a. From the conjunction, with Soul, of 'the properties of Nature,' i.e., Desire, &c., Soul, also, would turn out [contrary to Scripture,] to be associated with properties.
b. But, in regard to the latter [alternative], he says:
Objection, on the other branch.
9. If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then lordship would belong to every one.
a. That is to say: if lordship is by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet [which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron], then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that even all men, indifferently, experiencers in this or that [cycle of] creation, [may] have lordship; because it is only by conjunction with all experiencers, that Nature produces Mind, &c. And, therefore, your tenet of there being only one Lord is invalidated.
b. Be it as you allege; yet these are false reasonings; because they contradict the evidence which establishes [the existence of] a Lord. Otherwise, Nature, also, could be disproved by thousands of false reasonings of the like sort. He therefore says:
Denial that there is any evidence of a Lord.
10. It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord]; because there is no evidence of it.
a. Its establishment, i.e., the establishing that there is an eternal Lord. Of the Lord, in the first place, there is not sense-evidence; so that only the evidences of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable: such is the meaning.
b. The inapplicability he sets forth in two aphorisms:
Denial that it can be established by inference.
11. There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord]; because there is [here] no [case of invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken].
a. 'Association,' i.e., invariable concomitancy. 'There is none;' i.e., none exists, [in this case]. And so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as, 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' [the fact of] invariable concomitancy3 is not established, since there is no compulsion [that every product should have had an intelligent maker]. Such is the meaning.
b. Nor, moreover, he tells us, is there [the evidence of] Testimony [to there being a Lord]:
Denial that there is Scripture for it.
12. Moreover, there is Scripture for [this world's] being the product of Nature, [not of a Lord].
a. Scripture asserts, exclusively, that the world is the product of Nature, not that it has Soul for its cause.
b. He refutes, diffusely, by a cluster [of seven aphorisms],4 the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in the first Section,5 viz., 'Bondage does not arise from Ignorance,' [conjoined with Soul].
Conjunction, in the case of the solitary, would be a contradiction.
13. With that which is solitary there cannot be conjunction of the property of Ignorance.
a. Since Soul has no association [with anything whatever], it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance.
b. But then, [it may be replied,] what is to be asserted is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Ignorance [which is a negation, or nonentity]; and so, since this is no reality, there is no association occasioned thereby. To this he replies:
A suggestion repelled.
14. Since the existence of this [alleged negative Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction, there is a vicious circle.6
a. And, if it is by the conjunction of Ignorance that Ignorance is established, there is 'a vicious circle,' [literally, a resting of each on the other, alternately], a resting a thing on itself; or, in short, a regressus in infinitum.
b. In reply to the doubt [suggested by the Naiyáyika], 'but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the regressus in infinitum is no objection,' he replies:
The world has a beginning.
15. It is not as in the case of seed and sprout; for Scripture teaches that the world has a beginning.
a. There cannot belong to it such a regressus in infinitum as that of seed and sprout; because there is Scripture for the fact that the mundane state of souls, consisting of all undesirable things, viz., Ignorance, &c., had a beginning. For we hear, in Scripture, that these cease to exist at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c. Such is the meaning.
b. But then, [you Vedántís will say], according to us, Ignorance is technically so termed, and is not, e.g., in the shape, specified by the Yoga, of supposing what is not soul to be soul; and so, just like your 'Nature,' since this [Ignorance] of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, there is no disparagement of the solitariness thereof: in regard to this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word 'Ignorance,' he objects to it:
Soul and knowledge not identical.
16. Then Brahma would be found to be excluded [from existence]; because he is something else than knowledge.
a. If the meaning of the word 'Ignorance' (avidyá) be only 'otherness than knowledge,' then Brahma, soul itself, would be found to be excluded, to perish, through his being annihilable by knowledge; since he is other than knowledge: such is the meaning. [Further]:
Knowledge, not excluding ignorance, would be resultless.
17. Were there not exclusion, then there would be resultlesseness.
a. But, if, the existence of ignorance were really not excluded by knowledge, then there would be resultlessness of knowledge, because of its not debarring Ignorance, [which is the only result competent to knowledge]: such is the meaning.
b. He censures the other alternative, [viz., that knowledge might exclude Soul]:
On the Vedánta theory, the world ought to vanish.
18. If it [Ignorance,] meant the being excludible by Knowledge, it would be [predicable], in like manner, of the world, also.
a. If, on the other hand, the being excludible by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, which possesses properties, be, indeed, what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case 'the world,' the whole mundane system, viz., Nature, Mind, &c., would, also, in like manner, be Ignorance. And so, the whole mundane system being merely Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by one man's knowledge, the mundane system would become invisible to others, also. Such is the import.
The Vedánta theory self-contradictory.
19. If it [Ignorance,] were of that nature it would be something that had a commencement.7
a. Or suppose it to be the case, that to be Ignorance means simply the being excludible by Knowledge, still such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in souls [as held by Vedántís (see § 15, b.)], but must have had a commencement. For it is proved, by such recited texts as, 'Consisting of knowledge alone,'89 &c., that, at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge alone. Such is the meaning. Therefore, it is settled that there is no other Ignorance, annihilable by Knowledge, than that stated in the Yoga system; and this is a property of the understanding only, not a property of the soul.
b. By a cluster of [six] aphorisms,10 he clears up the primâ facie view of an opponent, in regard to that which was stated in the same Book [Book V., § 2], that Nature's energizing is due to Merit:
Merit is undeniable.
20. There is no denying Merit; because of the diversity in the operations of Nature.
a. Merit is not to be denied on the ground of its being no object of sense; because it is inferred; since, otherwise, 'the diversity in the operations of Nature' [accommodating one person, and inconveniencing another,] would be unaccounted for: such is the meaning.
b. He states further proof, also:
Proofs of this.
21. It [the existence of Merit,] is established by Scripture, by tokens, &c.
a. He shows to be a fallacy the argument of the opponent, that Merit exists not, because of there being no sense-evidence of it:
Sense-evidence not the only kind of evidence.
22. There is, here, no necessity; for there is room for other proofs.
a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a thing of which there is no mundane sense-evidence must be non-existent; because things are subject to other proofs.
b. He proves that there exists Demerit, as well as Merit:
Demerit as certain as Merit.
23. It is thus, moreover, in both cases.
a. That is to say: the proofs apply to Demerit, just as they do to Merit.
The proof of each the same.
24. If the existence [of Merit] be as of course, [because, otherwise, something would be unaccounted for], the same is the case in respect of both.
a. But then, merit is proved to exist by a natural consequence in this shape, viz., that, otherwise, an injunction would be unaccounted for; but there is none such in respect of demerit: so how can Scriptural or logical argument be extended to demerit? If any one says this, it is not so; since there is proof, in the shape of natural consequence, 'it is alike, in respect of both,' i.e., of both merit and demerit; because, otherwise, a prohibitory injunction, such as, 'He should not approach another's wife,' would be unaccounted for. Such is the meaning.
b. He repels the doubt, that, if Merit, &c., be acknowledged [to exist], then, in consequence of souls' having properties, &c., they must be liable to modification, &c.:
Merit, &c., inhere in what.
25. It is of the internal organ11 [not of soul] that Merit, &c., are the properties.
a. In the expression '&c.' are included all those that are stated, in the Vaiśeshika Institute, as peculiar qualities of soul.12
b. [To the objection, that the existence of an internal organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is debarred by Scripture, be replies]:
The Qualities exist, though not in soul.
26. And of the Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment.
a. The Qualities, viz., Purity, &c., and their properties, viz., happiness, &c., and their products, also, viz., Mind, &c., are not denied essentially, but are denied only adjunctively in respect of soul; just as we deny that heat [in red-hot iron,] belongs to the iron.
b. In regard to the doubt, 'Why, again, do we not deny them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words sleep, wish, &c.?' he says:
The above thesis argued.
27. By a conjunction of the five members [of an argumentative statement] we discern [that] Happiness [exists].
a. Here, in order to get a particular subject of his assertion, he takes happiness alone, one portion of the matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter. But the better reading is, 'we discern [that] Happiness, &c., [exist].' The five members of an argumentative statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Synthesis [of the two premises], and Conclusion; and, by the 'conjunction,' i.e., the combination, of these, all things, viz., Happiness, &c., are proved to exist. Such is the meaning.
b. And the employment [of the argument] is this:
(1)Pleasure is real;
(2)Because it produces motion in something.
(3)Whatever produces motion in anything is real, as are sentient beings;
(4)And pleasure produces motion in things, in the way of horripilation, &c.:
(5)Therefore, it is real.
c. But then the Chárváka, next, doubts whether there be any evidence other than sense-evidence; since [he contends,] there is no truth in the assertion [of an inductive conclusion], that such and such is pervaded by such and such, &c.13
The validity of inference questioned.
28. Not from once apprehending is a connexion established.
a. That is to say: from once apprehending concomitance [of a supposed token and the thing betokened], a 'connexion,' i.e., a pervadedness [or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened,] is not established; and frequency [of the same apprehension] follows14 [the rule of the single apprehension; just as a thousand times nothing amount to nothing]. Therefore [argues the sceptic,] since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference. [This] he clears up:
This point cleared up.
29. Pervadedness is a constant consociation of characters, in the case of both, or of one of them.
a. 'Consociation of characters,' i.e., consociation in the fact of being characters [or properties of something]; in short, concomitancy. And so we mean, that that concomitancy is 'pervadedness,' [furnishing solid ground for inference], which is invariably non-errant, whether in the case of 'both,' the predicate and the reason, or in the case of 'one of them,' the reason only. 'Of both' is mentioned with reference to the case of 'equal pervadedness': [e.g., every equilateral triangle is equiangular, and, conversely, every equiangular triangle is equilateral]. And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confutation [or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it]; so that there is no impossibility in apprehending 'pervadedness,' [and of inferring on the strength of it]. Such is the import.
b. He declares that Pervadedness is not an additional principle, consisting, e.g., of some such power as is to be mentioned [in § 31]:
Pervadedness not an additional principle.
30. It [Pervadedness,] is not [as some think (see § 31),] an additional principle [over and above the twenty-five (Book I., § 61)]; for it is unsuitable to postulate entities [praeter rationem].
a. 'Pervadedness' is not an entity other than a fixed consociation of characters; because it is unsuitable to suppose, further, some entity as the residence of what constitutes 'pervadedness.' But we consider that what constitutes 'pervadedness' belongs to extant things simply. Such is the meaning.
b. He states the opinion of others:
A heterodox opinion regarding 'Pervadedness.'
31. [But certain] teachers say that it [Pervadedness,] is [another principle, in addition to the twenty-five,] resulting from the power of the thing itself.
a. But other teachers assert that 'Pervadedness' is, positively, a separate principle, in the shape of a species of power, generated by the native power of the 'pervaded.' But [they continue,] 'Pervadedness' is not simply a power of the [pervaded] thing itself; else it would exist wherever the thing is, [which 'pervadedness' does not do]. For smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point of its origination], is not attended by fire; and, by going into another place, that power is put an end to. Therefore [contend these teachers,] there is no over-extension in the above-stated definition; for, according to our doctrine, the smoke [which betokens fire] is to be specialized as that which is at the time of origination. Such is the import.
Opinion of Panchaśikha
32. Panchaśikha15 says that it ['Pervadedness,'] is the possession of the power of the sustained.
a. That is to say: Panchaśikha holds that pervadingness is the power which consists in being the sustainer, and that 'Pervadedness'16 is the having the power which consists in being the sustained; for Intellect, and the rest, are treated as being pervaded [or invariably attended,] by Nature, &c.; [and this means that each product, in succession] is sustained by what precedes it in the series].
b. But then, why is a 'power of the sustained' postulated? Let 'Pervadedness' be simply an essential power of the thing pervaded. To this he [Panchaśikha,] replies:
Panchaśikha's reply to the objection.
33. The relation is not an essential power; for we should have [in that case,] a tautology.
a. But 'the relation,' viz., 'Pervadedness,' is not an essential power; for we should [thus] have a tautology; because, just as there is no difference between 'water-jar' and 'jar for water,' so, also, there is none in the case of 'Intellect' and 'what is Pervaded' [by Nature, of which Intellect consists]. Such is the meaning.
b. He himself explains the 'Tautology:'
The reason why.
34. Because we should find the distinction unmeaning; [as Intellect does not differ from Nature at all, except as does the sustained from the sustainer].
a. This is almost explained by the preceding aphorism.
b. He [Panchaśikha,] mentions another objection:
A further reason.
35. And because it [Pervadedness,] would not be reconcilable in shoots, &c.
a. Because shoots, &c., are invariably attended [at their origination,] by trees, &c. But this cannot be called simply an essential power [in the shoot]; because, since the essential power [that which belongs to the shoot as being a shoot,] does not depart, even in the case of an amputated shoot, we should, even then, find it attended [by the tree, which, however, no longer accompanies it]. Such is the sense. But the power [(see § 32), which consists in having the character] of the 'sustained' is destroyed at the time of amputation; so that there is no 'Pervadedness' then. Such is the import.
b. But then what? Panchaśikha says that 'Pervadedness' is not a result of any essential power. Then, since smoke is not sustained by fire [see § 32, where he contends that 'sustainedness' is what really expresses pervasion], it would turn out that it [viz., smoke,] is not [as token of something that is betokened,] accompanied by fire. To this he says:
Reply, that this would prove too much.
36. Were it [thus] settled that it is a power of the 'sustained,' then, by the like argument, its dependence on an essential power, [as pretended by the heterodox teachers referred to in § 31, might be proved, also; and thus the argument proves nothing, since it proves too much].
a. That is to say: 'were it settled' that 'a power of the sustained' constitutes the fact of 'Pervadedness,' it would be really settled 'by the like argument.' i.e., by parity of reasoning, that the fact of 'Pervadedness' results from essential power, also, [§ 31. a.].
b. It was with a view to substantiate what was stated [in § 27], viz., that the Qualities, and the rest, are established [as realities,] by the employment of the five-membered [form of argumentative exposition], that he has repelled, by an exposition of 'Pervadedness,' the objection to Inference as evidence, [or as a means of attaining right notions].
c. Now, in order to establish the fact that words, of which the five-membered [exposition] consists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others to a word's being a means of right knowledge,17 in the shape of [the objection of] its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words:
Sound and sense.
37. The connexion between word and meaning is the relation of expressed and expresser.
a. To the 'meaning' belongs the power termed expressibleness; to the 'word,' the power termed expression: simply this is their 'connexion;' their interrelation, as it were.18 From one's knowing this [connexion between a given word and meaning], the meaning is suggested [or raised in the mind,] by the word. Such is the import.
b. He mentions what things cause one to apprehend the powers [in question]:
Sense of words how learned.
38. The connexion [between a word and its sense] is determined by three [means].
a. That is to say: the connexion [just] mentioned [in § 37,] is apprehended by means of these three, viz., information from one competent [to tell us the meaning], the usage of the old man [whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe what actions ensue, in consequence (see the Sáhitya-darpaṉa, § 11)], and application to the same thing which has a familiar name, [whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym].
Imperatives and predications.
39. There is no restriction to what is to be done; because we see it both ways.
a. That is to say: and there is no necessity that this apprehension of the powers [§ 37,] should occur only in the case of 'something [directed] to be done;' because, in [the secular life and dealings of] the world, we see the usage of the old man, &c., [§ 38,] in regard to what is not to be done [being something already extant], also, as well as in regard to what is to be done.
Scriptural and secular senses of words the same.
40. He who is accomplished in the secular [connexion of words with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda.
a. Here he entertains a doubt:
A doubt.
41. Not by the three [means mentioned in § 38, objects some one, can the sense of the Veda be gathered]; because the Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses.
a. Of these he first repels the assertion, that what is meant [by the Veda] is something transcending the senses:
This cleared up.
42. Not so [i.e., what is meant by the Veda is not something transcending the senses]; because sacrificings, &c., are, in themselves, what constitutes merit, preeminently.
a. What is asserted [in § 41,] is not the case; since sacrificings, gifts, &c., in the shape, e.g., of the relinquishment of some thing for the sake of the gods, are really, in themselves, 'what constitutes merit,' i.e., what is enjoined by the Veda, 'preeminently,' i.e., because of their having preeminent fruit. And sacrificings, &c., since they are in the shape of wishings, &c., [of which we are perfectly conscious,] are not something transcending intuition. But 'what constitutes merit' [which the objector supposes to transcend intuition,] does not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacrificings &c., whence what is enjoined in the Veda must be beyond intuition. Such is the meaning.
b. He repels also what was asserted [in § 41], viz., that, inasmuch as it [the Veda,] is superhuman, there can be no instruction by any competent person, [in regard to its import]:
Knowledge of the Veda traditional.
43. The natural force [of the terms in the Veda] is ascertained through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively transmit the knowledge].
a. But then, still, how can there be apprehension of the sense of Vaidic terms, in the case of gods, fruits [of actions], &c., which transcend sense? To this he replies:
Intelligibility of the Veda undeniable.
44. This really takes place; because they [viz., the words,] give rise to knowledge, in the case both of things adapted [to sense] and of things not [so] adapted.
a. He defines the, peculiarities which belong to words, just because this matter is connected with the question of the power of words to cause right knowledge:19
Eternity of the Vedas denied.
45. The Vedas are not from eternity; for there is Scripture for their being a production.
a. Then are the Vedas the work of [the Supreme] Man? To this he replies, 'No':
The Lord not the author.
46. They [the Vedas,] are not the work of [the Supreme] Man; because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being, possibly,] their maker.
a. Supply, 'because we deny that, there is a Lord.'20 [This is] simple.
b. Adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he says:
Who are not authors of the Vedas.
47. Since the liberated is unsuited [to the work, by his indifference], and the unliberated is so, [by his want of power] neither of these can be author of the Vedas].21
a. But then, in that case, since they are not the work of [the Supreme] Man, it follows that they are eternal. To this he replies:
An illustration.
48. As in the case of sprouts, &c., their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man.
a. [This is] plain.
b. But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., are productions, we must infer that they are the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies:
Plants denied to be works.
49. Were this the case with these, also, [i.e., if it were the case that vegetables were works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c.
a. It is seen, in the world, as an invariable fact,22 that whatever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend; [for we see no embodied Supreme Man to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth can be referred]. Such is the meaning.
b. But then, since they were uttered by the Primal Man, the Vedas, moreover, are, really, the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies:
Only what is voluntary is a work.
50. That [only] is Man's work, in respect of which, even be it something invisible, an effort of understanding takes place.23
a. As in the case of what is visible, so, too, in the case of what is invisible, in respect of what thing there takes place 'an effort of understanding,' i.e., a consciousness that Thought preceded,24 that thing alone is spoken of as Man's work: such is the meaning. Thus it has been remarked that a thing is not Man's work merely through its having been uttered by Man; for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work, [or voluntary act]. But what need to speak of antecedence of Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed, of themselves, from the Self-existent, through the force of fate, wholly unpreceded by thought. Therefore, they are not [a Supreme] Man's work.25
b. But then, in that case, since they are not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences,26 the Vedas, moreover, like the speech of a parrot, can convey no right knowledge.27 To this he replies:
The Vedas their own evidence.
51. They are, spontaneously, conveyers of right knowledge, from the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly].
a. That is to say: the authoritativeness28 of the very whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as its being based on the enouncer's knowledge of the truth, but quite 'spontaneously;' because, as for the Vedas' 'own,' i.e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations29 [which produce the result promised], and in the Medical Scripture, [the following of which leads to cures], &c. And so there is the aphorism of the Nyáya [Book II., § 681]: 'And [the fact of] its being a cause of right knowledge, like the validity of invocations, and the Medical Scripture,' &c.
b. In regard to the proposition [laid down in § 26, viz.], 'And of the [existence of the] Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment,' there was duly alleged, and developed [under § 27], one argument, viz., by the establishing the Existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another argument in respect of that [same proposition]:
Cognition is evidence of existence.
52. There is no Cognition of what is no entity, as a man's horn.
a. Be it, moreover, that the existence of pleasure, &c., is proved by the reasoning [under § 27]; it is proved by mere consciousness, also. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely nonentities, even the consciousness could not be accounted for; because there is no cognition of a man's horn, and the like. Such is the meaning.
b. But then, [interposes the Naiyáyika,] if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be quite absolutely real; and then, in the expression 'not absolute debarment' [in § 26], the word 'absolute' is [superfluous, and, hence,] unmeaning. To this he replies:
The Qualities, &c., not absolutely real.
53. It is not of the real [that there is here cognizance]; because exclusion is seen [of the Qualities].
a. It is not proper [to say], moreover, that the cognizance of the Qualities, &c., is that of the absolutely real; because we see that they are excluded [and not admitted to exist,] at the time of destruction [of the mundane system], &c.
b. But then, even on that showing, let the world be different both from real and from unreal; nevertheless, the demurring to absolute debarment [in § 26,] is untenable. To this he replies:
A Vedántic advance rejected.
54. It is not of what cannot be [intelligibly] expressed [that there is cognizance]; because there exists no such thing.
a. And there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of such [a thing] as is not to be expressed as either existing or not existing; 'because there. exists no such thing,' i.e., because nothing is known other than what exists, or what does not exist: such is the meaning. The import is, because it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen.
b. But then, on that showing, do you really approve of [the Nyáya notion of] 'cognizing otherwise,' [or our fancying that nature to belong to one, which belongs to another]? He replies, 'No':
A Nyáya view rejected.
55. There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one, which belongs to another]; because your own proposition is self-destructive.
a. This, also, is not proper [to be said], viz., that one thing appears under the character of another thing [e.g., a rope, under the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken, in the dusk]; 'because your own proposition is self-destructive.'30 Of another nature [e.g., snakehood], in a different thing [e.g., a rope], equivalence to a man's horn, is [what is virtually] expressed by the word 'otherwise' [than the truth; both a man's horn, and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake, being, alike, otherwise than real]; and [yet] its cognition [thus] otherwise is asserted, [as if that could be cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized]: hence your own proposition is self-destructive. For even those who contend for 'cognizing otherwise' [as one mode of cognition,] declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impossible. Such is the meaning.31
b. Expounding what he had said above, [in § 26,] 'not absolute debarment,' he sums up his doctrine:
Summing up.
56. They [the Qualities,] are cognized rightly or wrongly, through their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise].
a. All the Qualities, &c., 'are cognized rightly and wrongly.' How? 'Through their being denied and not denied.' There is non-denial, as far as regards their existing at all; because all things [and things are made up of the Qualities,] are eternal. But there is denial, relatively, in Soul, of all things; just as is the case with the imaginary silver, for example, in a pearl-oyster, &c., or with the redness, &c., in crystal, &c., [which has no redness, without its following that redness, altogether and everywhere, is non-existent].
b. This investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, it having presented itself in this connexion, is taken in hand incidentally, at the end; [the Sánkhya not allowing to Testimony a coordinate rank with Sense and Inference]:
The Yoga theory of speech rejected.
57. A word does not consist of [what the Yogas call] the 'expresser' (sphoṭa); by reason both of cognizance [which would disprove the existence of such imaginary thing,] and of non-cognizance, [which would, in like manner, disprove it].
a. It is held, by the followers of the Yoga, that there exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible [unit, the] word, such as 'jar,' &c., [which they call] the 'expression;'32 just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else than the parts, viz., the shell-shaped neck, &c.; and that particular sound, termed a word, is called the 'expresser,' because of its making apparent the meaning: such a word [we Sánkhyas assert, in opposition to the Yogas,] is without evidence [of its existence]. Why? 'By reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance,' [as thus]: Pray, is that word [which you choose to call the 'expression,'] cognized, or not? On the former alternative, what need of that idle thing, [the supposed 'expression'? For,] by what collection of letters, distinguished by a particular succession, this ['expression'] is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. But, on the latter alternative, [viz., that it is not cognized], the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an 'expression' which is not cognized. Therefore, the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is useless. Such is the meaning.
b. The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted33 before, [under § 45]. Now he contradicts also the eternity of letters:
The eternity of letters denied.
58. Sound is not eternal; because we perceive it to be made.
a. It is not proper [to say, as the Mímánsakas say], that letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e.g., that 'This is that same G'; for they are proved to be non-eternal, by the cognition, e.g., that '[the sound of] G has been produced': such is the meaning. And the recognition has reference to the homogeneousness with that [one which had been previously heard]; for, otherwise, it would turn out that a jar, or the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is recognized.
b. He ponders a doubt:
A doubt.
59. [Suppose that] there is [in the case of sounds,] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled; as [the manifestation] of a [preexistent] jar by a lamp.
a. But then [some one may say], of Sound, whose existence was 'previously settled,' the manifestation, through noise, &c., that alone is the object in the cognition of its production, [which you speak of in § 58]. An example of manifestation [of a thing previously existing] is, 'as of a jar by a lamp.'
b. He repels this:
The doubt disposed of.
60. If the dogma of products' being real [is accepted by you], then this is a proving of the already proved.
a. If you say that 'manifestation' means the taking of a present condition by means of rejecting an unarrived [or future,] condition, then this is our dogma of the reality of products [Book I., § 115]; and such an eternity belongs to all products, [not specially to Sound]; so that you are proving the already proved [or conceded]: such is the meaning. And, if 'manifestation' is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then we should find [on your theory,] that jars, &c., also, are eternal; because it would be proper [on that theory,] that the object in the perception of production, by the operation of the causes [the potter, &c.], should be that of knowledge only, as in the case of words, &c., and also in the case of jars, &c.; [for the jar is shown by the lamp, not made by it]. Such is the import.34
b. An objection to the non-duality of Soul, not previously mentioned, is to be adduced; therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced, [having been already handled under Book I., § 149].
Non-duality of Soul denied on grounds of Inference.
61. Non-duality of Soul35 is not; for its distinctions are cognized through signs.
a. That is to say: because it is proved to be really different [in different persons], by the sign that one quits Nature [or escapes from the mundane condition], while another not does quit it, &c.
b. But, he tells us, there is even sense-evidence destructive of the non-distinction of Soul from things [that are] non-Soul, asserted in the Scriptural texts, 'All this is Soul only,'36 'All this is Brahma only:'37
Non-duality denied on grounds of Sense.
62. Moreover, there is not [non-distinction of Soul] from non-Soul; because this is disproved by sense-evidence.
a. That is to say: moreover, there is not a non-distinction between the non-Soul, i.e., the aggregate of the experienceable, and Soul; because this is excluded also by sense-evidence, [as well as by signs, (§ 61)]; because, if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also not be different from a jar and a web; since the jar, e.g., would not be other than the web, which [by hypothesis,] is not other than the Soul: and this is excluded by sense-evidence, which constrains us to apprehend a distinction [between a jar and a web].
b. In order to clear the minds of learners, he illustrates this point, though already established:
The reasons combined.
63. Not between the two [Soul and non-Soul, is there non-difference]; for that same [couple of reasons].
a. 'Between the two,' i.e., between Soul and non-Soul, the two together, also, there is not an absolute non-difference; for the couple of reaaons [given in § 61 and § 62]: such is the meaning.
b. But then, in that case, what is the drift of such Scriptural texts as, '[All] this is Soul only?' To this he replies:
Scripture accomodates itself to human frailty of understanding.
64. There it is for the sake of something else, in respect of the undiscriminating.
a. That is to say: 'in respect of the undiscriminating,' with reference to undiscriminating persons, in the case or non-difference [between Soul and non-Soul, apparently asserted in Scripture], it is 'there for the sake of something else;' i.e., the observation38 is [designed to be] provocative of worship. For, in the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the experienced and the experiencer, are regarded as indifferent; [and Scripture humours the worldling's delusion, with a view to eventually getting him out of it].
b. He declares, that, according to the asserters of Non-duality [of soul], there can be no material cause of the world, either:
The Vedánta system supplies no material for the world.
65. Neither soul, nor Ignorance,39 nor both, can be the material cause of the world; because of the solitariness of [Soul].
a. The soul alone, or Ignorance lodged in the soul, or both together, like a pair of jar-halves [conjoined in the formation of a jar], cannot be the material of the world; 'because of the solitariness' of Soul. For things undergo alteration only through that particular conjunction which is called 'association;' hence the [ever] solitary Soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot serve as a material cause. Nor can it do so by means of [association with] Ignorance, either; because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitariness. Moreover, that the two together should be the material is impossible, even as it is that either, severally, should be the material; simply 'because of the solitariness.' Such is the meaning. And, if you choose that Ignorance should subsist as a substance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment of the non-duality of Soul, [for which you Vedántís contend].
b. He himself [in Book I., § 145] decided that the soul consists of light, [or knowledge]. In regard to this, he repels the primâ facie view, founded on the text, 'Brahma is reality, knowledge, and joy,'40 that the essence of the soul is joy, also:
Soul not joy and knowledge, both.
66. The two natures, joy and knowledge do not belong to one; because the two are different.
a. A single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence; because, since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are different: such is the meaning.
b. But then, in that case, what becomes of the Scripture, that it [Soul,] consists of joy? To this he replies:
A Vedánta term explained away.
67. Metaphorical [is the word joy, in the sense] of the cessation of pain.
a. That is to say: the word 'joy,' in the Scriptural expression which means, really, the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. This is stated in [the maxim], 'Pleasure is the departure of both pain and pleasure.'
b. He states the cause of this metaphorical employment:
Why the term was used in a sense not literal.
68. It is [as] a laudation of emancipation, for the sake of the dull.
a. That is to say: the Scripture, as an incitement to 'the dull,' i.e., the ignorant, lauds, as if it were joy, the emancipation, consisting in the cessation of pain, which [cessation] is the essence of the soul;41 [for the soul is such joy as consists of the absence of pain].
b. In order to manifest immediately the origin, already declared,42 of the internal organ, he repels the primâ facie view, that the Mind is all-pervading.
The Mind not all-pervading.
69. The Mind is not all-pervading; because it is an instrument, and because it is, moreover, an organ.
a. The Mind, meaning the totality of the internal instruments,43 is not all-pervading; for it is an instrument, as an axe, or the like, is. The word 'and' [literally, 'or,' in the Aphorism,] implies a distributive alternative, [not an optional one]. The meaning is this, that, [while the whole of the internal instruments are instruments,] the particular internal instrument, the third44 [the Mind, manas45]. is not all-pervading; because it is, moreover, an organ.46 But knowledge, &c., pervading the body, are demonstrable as only of medium extent, [neither infinite nor atomic].
b. Here, there being a doubt whether this be convincing, he propounds an appropriate confutation:
Proof of this.
70. [The Mind is not all-pervading]; for it is moveable; since there is Scripture regarding the motion.
a. That is to say; since, inasmuch as there is Scripture regarding the going of the Soul [which, being all-pervading, cannot go] into another world, it being settled that it is its adjunct, the internal organ, that is movable, [see Book I., § 51], it cannot be all-pervading.
b. In order to prove that it is a product, he repels also the opinion that the Mind is without parts:
The Mind has no parts.
71. Like a jar, it [the Mind,] is not without parts; because it comes in contact therewith, [i.e., with several Senses, simultaneously].
a. The word 'therewith' refers to 'organ,' which occurs in a preceding aphorism, [§ 69]. The Mind is not without parts; 'because it comes in contact,' simultaneously, with several sense-organs. But, 'like a jar,' it is of medium size, [neither infinite nor atomic], and consists of parts. Such is the meaning. And it is to be understood that the internal organ, when in the state of a cause, [and not modified and expanded, e.g., into knowledge, which is its product,] is, indeed, atomic.
b. He demurs to the eternity of Mind, Time, &c:
Eternity belongs to what.
72. Everything except Nature and Soul is uneternal.
a. [This is] plain. And the Mind,47 the Ether, &c., when in the state of cause, [not developed into product], are called Nature, and not Intellect,48 &c., by reason of the absence of the special properties, viz., judgment,49 &c.
b. But then, according to such Scriptural texts as, 'He should know Illusion to be Nature, and him in whom is Illusion to be the great Lord, and this whole world to be pervaded by portions of him,'50 since Soul and Nature, also, are made up of parts, they must be uneternal. To this he replies:
Soul and Nature not made up of parts.
73. No parts [from the presence of which in the discerptible, one might infer destructibility,] are found in the Experiencer; for there is Scripture for its being without parts.
a. Parts are not appropriate to 'the Experiencer,' i.e., to Soul, or to Nature; for there is Scripture for their being without parts; that is to say, because of such [texts] as, 'Without parts, motioniess, quiescent, unobjectionable, passionless.'51
b. It has been stated [in Book I., § 1,] that Emancipation is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, he then repels the doctrines of others, in regard to Emancipation:
A view of Emancipation disputed.
74. Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy; because there are no properties [in Soul, as, e.g., in the shape of joy].
a. There belongs to Soul no property in the shape of joy, or in the shape of manifestation; and the essence [of Soul] is quite eternal, and, therefore, not something to be produced by means: therefore, Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy: such is the meaning.
Second view disputed.
75. Nor, in like manner, is it [Emancipation,] the destruction of special qualities.
a. Emancipation is, moreover, not the destruction of all special qualities, 'In like manner.' Because there are absolutely no properties [in Soul, (see § 74)]. Such is the meaning.
A third view disputed.
76. Nor is it [Emancipation,] any particular going of that [Soul,] which is motionless.
a. Moreover, emancipation is not a going to the world of Brahmá;52 because the Soul, since it is motionless, does not go.
A fourth view disputed.
77. Nor is it [Emancipation,] the destruction of the influence of [intellectual] forms, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &c.
a. The meaning is, that also the doctrine of the Nihilist, that the Soul consists merely of momentary knowledge, that Bondage is the modifying thereof by objects, and that emancipation is the destruction of the influence thereof called Memory,53 is inadmissible; because, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &c., [such] emancipation is not the Soul's aim.
b. He censures another [conception of] emancipation of the Nihilist's:
A fifth view disputed.
78. Nor is it [Emancipation,] destruction of all; for this has, among other things, the fault of not being the soul's aim.
a. Likewise, the entire destruction of the Soul, which consists of knowledge, is not emancipation; because, among other things, we do not see, in the world, that the annihilation of the soul is the soul's aim: such is the meaning.
A sixth view disputed.
79. So, too, the Void.
a. The annihilation of the whole universe, consisting of cognition and the cognizable, is, thus, also, not emancipation; because Soul's aim is not effected by Soul's annihilation: such is the meaning.
A seventh view disputed.
80. And conjunctions terminate in separations; therefore, it [Emancipation,] is not the acquisition of lands, &c., either.
a. From its perishableness, possessorship is not Emancipation.
An eighth view disputed.
81. Nor is it [Emancipation,] conjunction of a Part with the Whole.
a. Emancipation is not absorption of 'a Part,' i.e., the Soul, into 'the Whole,' i.e., that of which it is [on the view in question,] a part, viz., the Supreme Soul; for the reason assigned [in § 80], viz., 'conjunctions terminate in separations,' and because we do not admit a Lord [Book I., § 92], and because, thus, self-dissolution is not Soul's aim: such is the meaning.
A ninth view disputed.
82. Nor is it [Emancipation], moreover, conjunction with the [power of] becoming as small as an atom, &c.; since, as is the case with other conjunctions, the destruction of this must necessarily take place.
a. Moreover, conjunction with superhuman power, e.g., the assuming the size of an atom, is not Emancipation; because, just as is the case with connexions with other superhuman powers, the destruction of this, also, follows, of necessity: such is the meaning.
A tenth view disputed.
83. Nor, just as in that case, is it [Emancipation], moreover, conjunction with the rank of Indra, &c.
a. Nor is the attainment of the superhuman power of Indra, &c., Emancipation,—just as is the case with other superhuman powers [such as assuming atomic bulk];—by reason of perishableness: such is the meaning.
b. He repels the objection of an opponent to what has been stated [in Book I., § 61], that the Organs are products of Self-consciousness:
The organs whence.
84. The Organs are not formed of the Elements [as the Naiyáyikas assert]; because there is Scripture for their being derived from Self-consciousness.
a. With advertence to the opinion that Power, &c., also, are principles, he repels the determination of categories [insisted upon by the various sects] of his opponents, and the notion that Emancipation comes through a knowledge of these [categories] merely:
The categories of the Vaiśeshika objected to.
85. The rule of six categories is not [the correct one]; nor does Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith, [as the Vaiśeshikas maintain].
And those of the Nyáya, &c.
86. So, too, is it in the case of the sixteen [categories of the Nyáya], &c.
a. In order to establish, what has been already stated [in Book I., § 62], that the five Elements are products, he rejects the eternity of the Earthy and other Atoms, which is held by the Vaiśeshikas and others:
The eternity of Atoms unscriptural.
87. [The five Elements being products, as declared in Book I., § 61], Atoms are not eternal, [as alleged in the Nyáya]; for there is Scripture for their being products.
a. Although that text of Scripture is not seen by us, because it has disappeared, in the lapse of time, &c., yet, it is to be inferred from the words of teachers, and from the tradition of Manu, [Ch. I., v. 27].
b. But then, how can an Atom, which is without parts, be a product? To this he replies:
The Scripture decisive of the question.
88. Since it is a product, it is not without parts.
a. That is to say: since the fact, established by Scripture, of their being products, cannot be otherwise accounted for, the [so-called] Atoms of Earth, &c., are not without parts.
b. He repels the objection of the Nihilist, that direct cognition of Nature, or of Soul, is impossible; because [forsooth,] the cause of a thing's being directly cognizable is colour:
A cavil disposed of.
89. There is no necessity that direct cognition should have colour as its cause.
a. It is no rule, that to be directly cognizible should result from colour only, [or other object of sense], as the cause; because direct cognition may result from Merit, &c., [viz., mystical practices, and so forth], also: such is the meaning.
b. Well, if that be the case, pray is the dimension of an Atom a reality, or not? With reference to this, he decides the question of dimension, [as follows]:
Dimension of what kinds.
90. There are not four varieties of dimension; because those can be accounted for by two.
a. There are not four kinds of dimension, viz., small, great, long, and short; but there are only two sorts. 'Because those can be accounted for by two:' that is to say, the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two, the atomic [or positively small,] and the great. Such is the meaning. For the short and the long are merely subordinate kinds of the dimension called great; else we should have, e.g., no end of dimensions, in the shape of the crooked, &c.
b. He rebuts the Nihilist's denial of genera, [as follows]:
Genus proved by recognition.
91. Though these [individuals] be uneternal, recognition, as being associated with constancy, is of genus.
a. Hence, he says, it is not proper to deny [the existence] of genus:
And not to be denied.
92. Therefore it [genus,] is not to be denied.
a. But then [it may be said], recognition is to be accounted for simply by a non-existence, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing [recognized]: and let this be what is meant by the word 'genus.' To this he replies:
Genus positive, not negative.
93. It [genus,] does not consist in exclusion of something else; because it is cognized as an entity.
a. That is to say: genus does not consist in exclusion [of something else]; because 'This is that same' is the cognition of something positive; for, otherwise, the only thing cognized would be, 'This is not a non-jar.'
b. But still, recognition may be caused by likeness. To this he replies:
Likewise not a distinct principle.
94. Likeness is not a separate principle; for it is directly apprehended, [as one manifestation of Community].
a. That is to say: likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.; for it is directly apprehended as consisting in sameness; [the likeness of a fair face to the moon, e.g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either].
b. The conjecture, 'But then, let likeness be really an inherent power, and not [a modified aspect of] Community,' he repels:
Nor a peculiar power.
95. Nor is it [likeness,] a manifestation of [something's] own power; because the apprehension of it is different.
a. Moreover, likeness is not the manifestation of a particular natural power of a thing; because the apprehension of likeness is different from the apprehension of power. For the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing; the cognition of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cognition of a correlative,54 as is the case with the cognition of a non-existence; so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous. Such is the meaning.
b. But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be merely that they have [all alike,] the name, e.g., of jar. To this he replies:
Nor the relation between names and things.
96. Nor, moreover, is it [likeness,] the connexion between name and named.
a. Because even he who does not know the connexion between a name and the thing named may cognize a likeness, [e.g., between two jars].
b. Moreover:
How it cannot be so.
97. That connexion [viz., between name and named,] is not eternal; since both [the correlatives] are uneternal.
a. Since both the name and the named are uneternal, the relation between them, also, is not eternal. How, then, can there be, through that, the likeness of a departed thing in a thing present? Such is the meaning.
b. But then, though the correlatives be uneternal, let the relation be eternal. What is to hinder this? To this he replies:
Another suggestion repelled.
98. The connexion is not so [not eternal], for this reason, viz., because this is debarred by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing; [i.e., the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term].
a. Connexion is proved only where disjunction incidentally subsists; because, otherwise, there is no room for the supposition of connexion; the case being accounted for,—as will be explained,—simply by the natural state of the matter. And this incidental disjunction is impossible, if connexion be eternal. Therefore, connexion is not eternal; for this is debarred by the very evidence that acquaints us with Connexion. Such is the meaning.
b. But, on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence55 between those two eternals, a Quality and the thing qualified; [which Coinherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nyáya]. To this he replies:
The Category of Intimate Relation rejected.
99. There is no [such thing as] Coinherence, [such as the Naiyáyikas insist upon]; for there is no evidence [for it].
a. But then [it may be said], the evidence of it is, the perception that something is qualified [or conjoined with a quality which inheres in it], and the unaccountableness, otherwise, of the cognition of something as qualified. To this he replies:
This argued.
100. Neither perception nor inference [is evidence for the existence of Coinherence]; since, as regards both alike, the case is otherwise disposed of.56
a. Since, 'as regards both alike,' i.e., the perception of qualifiedness, and the inferring of it, 'the case is otherwise disposed of;'57 viz., simply by the natural state [of the thing and its qualities], neither of the two is evidence for [the imaginary category called] Coinherence: such is the meaning.
b. It is a tenet, that, from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and soul takes place, and thence results creation. In regard to that, there is this objection of the atheists, that 'Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation; everything is momentary; where it arises, even there it perishes; therefore, no motion is proved to be inferrible from conjunction [of anything] with another place;' [the fruit, for instance, which appears to reach the ground not being that fruit, any longer existent, which appeared to drop from the tree]. To this he replies:
Motion is a matter of perception.
101. Motion is not a matter of inference; for he who stands very near has, indeed, direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to.
a. In Book Second the different opinions were merely mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth; but no particular one was considered. In regard to this question, he denies the view of an opponent:
The Body is of Earth only.
102. The Body does not consist of five elements; because many [heterogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material.
a. He will mention, that, whilst there is but one material, the material of every Body is earth:
There is a Subtile as well as a Gross, Body.
103. It [the Body,] is not, necessarily, the Gross one; for there is, also, the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one.
a. Senses, [the organ of vision, for example,] distinct from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In order to substantiate this [point], he refutes the opinion, that the senses reveal what they do not reach to:
Connexion between sense and object.
104. The senses do not reveal what they do not reach to; because of their not reaching, or because [else,] they might reach everything.
a. The senses do not reveal things unconnected with them. 'Because of their not reaching.' For we do not see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach to; and because, if they were to reveal what they do not reach to, we should find them revealing all things, viz., those intercepted, and the like. Such is the meaning. Therefore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of connexion with the distant sun, &c. Such is the import. And the instruments reveal the objects simply by delivering the object to the soul,—for they are, themselves, unintelligent;—as a mirror reveals the face. Or [in other words], their revealing an object is simply their taking up an image of the object.
b. He repels the conjecture: But then, in that case, the opinion [of the Naiyáyikas,] that the sight is luminous is quite right; for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance, in the form of rays:
The Sight not formed of Light.
105. Not because Light glides [and the Sight does so, too,] is the Sight luminous [or formed of Light]; because the thing is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications, [to be now explained].
a. The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous, on the ground that light is seen to glide. Why? Because, just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modification. Such is the meaning. For, as the vital air, without having at all parted from the body, glides out ever so far from the end of the nose, under the modification called breathing, [and thus smells a distant flower], just so the Sight, though a non-luminous substance, without, indeed, quitting [connexion with] the body, all in a moment will dart off [like the protruded feeler of a polyp,] to a distant object, such as the sun, by means of the species of change called modification.
b. But what is the proof that there is any such modification? To this he replies:
Proof of his theory of vision, that it accounts for the phenomena.
106. By the sign of the display of the attained object the [existence of the] modification [which could alone account for that display,] is proved.
a. He shows [us] the nature of the modification, to account for the going, though without parting from the Body:
Of the theory, further.
107. The 'modification' is another principle than a fragment, or a quality, [of the Sight, or other sense]; because it is for the sake of connexion that it glides forth.
a. The modification is not a fragment of the Sight, or other sense, [serving as] the cause of the revealing of objects,—a part disjoined like a spark,—or a quality, like, e.g., Colour; but the modification, whilst a portion thereof, is something else than a fragment, or a quality. For, if there were disruption, connexion of the sun, &c., with the Sight would not, through it, take place; and, if it were a quality, the motion called 'gliding forth' would be unaccountable; [for a quality cannot move by itself]. Such is the meaning.
b. But, if, thus, the 'modifications' are substances, how is [the term] 'modification' applied to the qualities of intellect, in the shape of Desire, &c.? To this he replies:
'Modifications' may be qualities, as well as substances.
108. It [the term 'modification,'] is not confined to substances; because it is etymological, [not technical, and applies, etymologically, to a quality, as well].
a. Since it is also stated, in Scripture, that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur, whether the Scriptural texts are, perhaps, to be applied distributively, according to the difference of particular worlds. In regard to this, he says:
The materials of the organs everywhere the same.
109. Not though there be a difference of locality, is there a difference in the material [of which the organs are formed]: the rule is as with the like of us.
a. Not through 'difference of locality,' as the world of Brahmá, and the like, is it, again, the fact, that the organs have any other material than self-consciousness; but the rule is, that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness; as is the case, e.g., with us who live in this terrestrial world. For we hear, in Scripture, of only one Subtile Body [made up of the organs], transmigrating generally throngh the different localities. Such is the meaning.
b. But then, in that case, how is the Scripture relating to the materiality [of the organs] to be accounted for? To this he replies:
A non-literal text accounted for.
110. The mention thereof [viz., of materiality, as if it belonged to the organs,] is because there is [intended to be made, thereby, a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause.58
a. There is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is [but] concomitant, with a view to indicating its importance; just as fire is [spoken of as a rising] from fuel, [which fuel is a necessary concomitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire]. Hence are they [the organs,] spoken of as being formed of the Elements. Such is the meaning. For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Element, do the Organs, viz., the Sight, &c., [formed] from the accompanying Self-consciousness, come to exist; as fire, in reliance on the support of earthly fuel, results from the attendant Light, [or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone].
b. As the subject presents itself, he determines the variety that belongs to Gross Body:
Varieties of Gross Bodies.
111. The heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, thought-born, and spell-born; such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body, though a rough and customary one].
a. It was stated, before, that Body has only one Element as its material. In this same connexion, he observes discriminatively, as follows:
The material of Bodies.
112. In all [Bodies] Earth is the material: in consideration [however,] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case [treated under § 110].
a. In all Bodies the material is Earth only. 'In consideration of some speciality;' i.e., in consequence of intensity through excess, &c., in the case of Body, as before [in the case of the Organs], there is, however, designation as consisting of Elements, five, or four, &c., on the ground only of there being a support, as in the case of the materiality of the Organs. Such is the meaning.
b. But then, since the vital air is the principal thing in the Body, let the vital air itself be the originant of the Body. To this he replies:
The vital air not the source of the Body.
113. The vital air is not [on the allegation that it is the principal thing in the Body, to be considered] the originant of the Body; because it [the vital air, or spirit,] subsists through the power of the organs.
a. The vital air, consisting in the function of the organs, does not subsist in the absence of the organs. Therefore, since, in a dead Body, in consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is not the originant of the Body.
b. But then, in that case, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even without the vital air. To this he replies:
Soul essenial to a living body.
114. The site of experience [viz., the Body,] is contructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul]: otherwise, we should find putrefaction.
a. 'Through the superintendence,' i.e., only through the operation, 'of the experiencer,' i.e., Soul [literally, that which has the vital airs], is 'the construction of the site of experience,' i.e., the Body; because, 'otherwise,' i.e., if the operation of the vital airs were absent, we should find putrefaction in the semen and blood, just as in a dead body. Such is the meaning. And thus, by the several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a concomitant cause59 of the Body, through the sustaining of it: such is the import.
b. But then [it may be said], it is only the vital air, itself, that can be the superintender; because it is this which operates, not the Soul, since it is motoinless, and since there is no use in the superintendence of what does not operate. To this he replies:
The Soul 'acting by another's actions.'
115. Through a servant, not directly, is superintendence [exercised] by the master.
a. In the construction of the Body, 'superintendence,' in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i.e., immediately, [exercised] 'by the master,' i.e., by Soul, but 'through its servant,' in the shape of the vital airs; as in the case of a king's building a city: such is the meaning.
b. It was stated before [Book II., § 1,] that Nature's [agency] is 'for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated.' In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this, viz., 'How can the soul be eternally free, when we see it bound?' with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says:
Soul ever free.
116. In Concentration, profound sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul,] consists of Brahma.60
a. Then what is the difference of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies:
Perfect and imperfect emancipation.
117. In the case of the two, it is with a seed; in the case of the other, this is wanting.
a. 'In the case of the two,' viz., concentration and profound sleep, the identity with Brahma61 is 'with a seed,' i.e., associated with some cause of Bondage, [or reappearance in the mundane state]; 'in the case of the other,' i.e., in emancipation, this cause is absent: this is the distinction. Such is the meaning.
b. But then, Concentration and profound sleep are evident: but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This objection of the atheist he repels:
The reality of Emancipation.
118. But there are not the two [only]; because the triad, also [Emancipation inclusive], is evident; as are the two.
a. The meaning is, that, since Emancipation, also, is 'evident,' i.e., is inferrible, through the example of Concentration and profound sleep, there are not the two, viz., profound sleep and Concentration, only; but Emancipation, also, really is. And the argument is thus. The quitting of that identity with Brahma62 which [identity] exists during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through a fault, viz., Desire, or the like, lodged in the mind; and, if this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c.; and it is precisely this that is Emancipation.63
b. But then [suggests some one, with reference to § 117], granting, that, even notwithstanding the existence of the 'seed' [or source of return to the mundane state,] called Memory,64 a mental modification after the form of any object does not arise during concentration, inasmuch as Memory is [then] dulled [or deadened] by apathy, &c., yet, in the case of a person in profound sleep, since Memory prevails, there will really be cognition of objects; consequently, it is not proper to say that there is identity with Brahma during profound sleep. To this he replies:
Memory inactive during profound sleep.
119. There is not the revelation, by memory, of an object likewise during the conjunction of a [more potent] fault [such as sleep]: the secondary cause does not debar the principal.65
a. As in the case of apathy, so, also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep, Memory does not reveal its own objects, does not remind us of its objects; for the 'secondary,' the subordinate, Memory,66 cannot defeat the more potent fault of Sleep: such is the meaning. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless, incompetent to produce its effects; [and so there is nothing, in this, to prevent identification of Soul with Brahma, during profound sleep, any more than during apathetic Concentration]: such is the import.
b. It was stated, in the Third Book [§ 83], that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while still living, is 'in consequenue of a mere vestige of impression.'67 To this it is objected as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the [alleged person] emancipated during life, just as in the case of the like of us, [and this experience continuous,] even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object: now, this is unaccountable [on the hypothesis of his really being emancipated]; because the antecedent impression is annihilated, exactly on its having produced the first [instant of] experience, and because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as knowledge debars it; just as is the case with Merit. To this he replies:
An objection met to the possibility of emancipation in one still living.
120. A single impression [suffices to generate, and] lasts out68 the experience: but there are not different impressions, one to each [instant of] experience; else, we should have a postulation of many, [where a single one may suffice].
a. In like manner, in the case of the whirling of the potter's wheel, the self-continuant principle,69 called motal inertia, is to be regarded as only one, continuing till the completion of the whirling.
b. It has been stated [§ 111,] that there are vegetable Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in the case in question, there is not a Body, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external:
The Vegetable organism really a Body.
121. Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body]:70 trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [which have internal consciousness], are, also, sites of experiencer and experience; as in the former case.
a. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body, in which there is knowledge of the external; but it is to be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the site of experiencer and experience, belongs also to trees, &c., which have internal consciousness; because, 'as in the former case,' meaning the putrescence already mentioned [see § 114], of the Bodies of men, &c., [which takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [the living soul], even in the same way do withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c., also: such is the meaning. And to this effect there is Scripture.
Law, as well as Scripture, is authority for this.
122. And from the Legal Institutes [the same fact may be inferred, viz., that vegetables have bodies and are conscious].71
a. But then, from the fact that trees, &c., also, are thus conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. To this he replies:
Vegetables not moral agents.
123. Not merely through a Body is there susceptibility of Merit and Demerit; for Scripture tells us the distinction.
a. The vital spirit is not liable to the production of Merit and Demerit through a Body merely. Why? 'For Scripture tells us the distinction:' because we are told, in Scripture, that the liability results just from the being distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like [animal body, not vegetable]. Such is the meaning.
b. Showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds:
Body of three principal kinds.
124. Among the three there is a threefold distribution; the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both.
a. There is a threefold distribution of Body 'among the three,' i.e., among those highest, lowest, and intermediate,—all living beings,—viz., the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both: such is the meaning. Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the preeminent sages; a Body of experience, to Indra and others, and to things immovable, &c.; and a Body of both, to the royal sages. Here the division is [not exhaustive, but] into three, because of the preeminence [of these]; for, otherwise, we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience, [like Indra].
b. He mentions also a fourth Body:
A fourth kind of Body.
125. Not any one [of these], moreover, is that of the apathetic.
a. That is to say: the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three; such as was that of Dattátreya, Jaḍabharata, and others; for they possessed bodies consisting of mere knowledge.
b. In order to establish the non-existence of a Lord, which was stated before, he disproves the eternity of knowledge, desire, action, &c., which is accepted by others [as existing in the case of the Lord]:
Argument against the existence of a Lord.
126. Eternity does not [as is alleged by those who wish to establish the existence of a Lord,] belong to knowledge,72 &c., even in the case of the particular site, [viz., that of the supposed Lord]; as is the case with fire.
a. That is to say: just as we infer, from the example of ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire,73 also, is not eternal.
The argument really ex abundantiâ
127. And, because the site [viz. the supposed Lord] is unreal, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether knowledge, &c.. may be eternal, or not].
a. But then, in that case, how can it, indeed, be possible that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe; since we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers [though we do see some,] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers]? To this he replies:
The height to which asceticism may elevate.
128. The superhuman powers74 of concentration, just like the effects of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid.
a. That is to say: by the example of the effects of drugs, &c., even the superhuman powers of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are established.
b. He refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements; since this is hostile to the establishment [of the existence] of Soul:
Argument against Materialism.
129. Thought does not belong to the Elements; for it is not found in them separately, or, moreover, in the state of combination,—or, moreover, in the state of combination.
a. That is to say: Thought does not exist in the five Elements, even when in the state of combination; because we do not find Thought in them, generally, at the time of disjunction; [and there can be nothing in the product which does not preexist in the cause].
End of Book V.
Footnotes
1. For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed.
2. See, for a somewhat different translation, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed.
3. Vyápyatwa, here rendered, is regarded as a synonym of vyápti, by which sambandha, 'association,' is interpreted just above. Hence I have bracketed the words 'the fact of.' Ed.
4. Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Vide p. 264, note 4, supra. Ed.
5. Pada, here used for adhyáya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.
6. For a different translation of this Aphorism, and of what introduces and succeeds it, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 257, Ed.
7. Owing to a clerical defect, both my MSS. of Nágeśa's work omit this Aphorism, and also much of the comment preceding and following it. Ed.
8. Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, ii. 4, 12; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 12. Ed.
9. Professor Gough has, 'a pure indifference of thought.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 153. Ed.
10. Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Ed.
11. The 'great internal organ' (mahat), called also buddhi, is here referred to. See Book I., Aph. 64. a. Ed.
12. Vide supra, p. 71, Aph. 61. b. Ed.
13. For the Chárvákas' rejection of the anthority of inference, see pp. 5, et seq., of the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangrana by Professors Cowell and Gough. Ed.
14. As suggestive of the correction here required, see Professor Cowell's Aphorisms of Śáṇḍilya, &c., p. 8, text and foot-note. Ed.
15. The translator's 'the Panchaśikha' I have everywhere corrected. Ed.
16. This is to render vyápyatwa, on which vide supra, p. 320, note 3. Ed.
17. 'Being a means of right knowledge' here renders prámáṇya, represented, just before, by 'as evidence.' Ed.
18. Instead of 'simply,' &c., read, 'this itself is their connexion, such [a connexion] as [is seen] in anatheticity.'
The 'connexion' in question is the swarúpa-sambandha, for which see Professor Cowell's translation of the Kusumánjali, p. 13, note †.
A better reading than the one which Dr. Ballantyne accepted from me is, certainly, that which omits the clause rendered, 'to the word, the power termed expression.' According to Nagesa, 'the expressibleness inherent in the meaning is the connexion [intended].'
Anuyogin and anuyogitá, as Professor Cowell informs me, are the opposites of pratiyogin and pratiyogitá, which latter I would represent, provisionally, by 'antithetic' and 'antitheticity.'
Pratiyogin, a very much commoner technicality than anuyogin, occurs in the comment on Aph. 95 of this Book. It must suffice, here, to add, that, as I learn from Professor Cowell, the anuyogin, or 'anathetic,' of ghaṭábháva, 'non-existence of a jar,' is ghaṭábháva itself, and the pratiyogin, or 'antithetic' of ghaṭábháva is ghaṭa, 'jar.' Ed.
19. 'Power to cause right knowledge' is to render prámáṇya. Ed.
20. Vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed.
21. See Book I., Aph. 93 and 94, at pp. 113, 114, supra. Ed.
22. 'Invariable fact' is to translate vyápti. Ed.
23. Read: 'Even where an invisible [originator] is in question, that [thing] in respect of which there arises the idea of [its] being made is [what is meant by] a production by a person.'
Aniruddha, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva agree in supplying kartari after adṛishṭe. Ed.
24. Instead of Vijnána's expression, 'the idea of [its] being preeeded by consciousness,' Nágeśa has: 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness, i.e., the notion that it was produced aforethought.
Vedánti Mahádeva impliedly contrasts with a jar, as being a production of an intelligent and self-conscious maker, a sprout, which originates as a factor of a series of causes and effects alternating from the time when vegetation was first evolved. Also see the two aphorisms preceding the one commented on. Ed.
25. Instead of 'a thing is not Man's work,' &c., I have translated, in the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 65: 'Not from the mere fact of [its] being uttered by a person [can one say there is] producedness [of a thing] by [that] person; since it is not the wont to speak of the respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person: but, by [reason of its] production consciously, [a thing is said to be produced by a person]. The Vedas, however, just like an expiration, and by virtue of desert [of souls], issue, spontaneously, from Brahmá, without ever being consciously produced [by him]. Hence they are not productions of a person.'
Dr. Ballantyne was misled by the full stop mistakenly put, in my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, before ###.Ed.
26. Read, instead of 'since they are,' &c., 'since the true sense of their sentences was not originated consciously.' Ed.
27. The implied 'power to convey right knowledge' represents prámáṇya. Ed.
28. As in the aphorism, prámáṇya, which, soon after, is rendered by 'validity.' Ed.
29. Mantra, a word of various meanings. Ed.
30. See Book III., Aphorism 66, at p. 267, supra. Ed.
31. The text followed, in this paragraph is, throughout, very inferior; and the rendering of it also calls for some alteration. See, for the purer text, pp. 23, 24, of the Appendix to my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Ed.
32. For sphoṭa, 'eternal word,' which the translator renders by 'expresser,' and also by 'expressien,' see Professor Cowell's edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 331, foot-notes 2 and 3; and the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangraha by Professors Cowell and Gough, pp. 209, et seq.
It is likewise observable that, in what precedes and follows, śabda is variously rendered, besides that śabda and pada are not discriminated. Ed.
33. Pratishiddha, 'demurred to.' Ed.
34. Vide supra, p. 142, c. Ed.
35. Nagesa, as also some copies of Vijnána's work, has 'non-duality of souls.' Ed.
36. Chhándogya Upanishad, vii., xxv., 2. Ed.
37. For a very similar passage, vide supra, p. 243, near the foot. Ed.
38. To render anuváda, which, as defined by Professor Cowell, signifies, 'the reiteration or reinculcation of an injunction, it may be with further details, but without dwelling on the purpose of the injunction itself.' Aphorisms of Śáṇḍilya, &c., p. 75, foot-note. At pp. 24 and 26, he translates anuváda by 'confirmatory repetition' and 'illustrative repetition.' Ed.
39. According to Nágeśa's reading, 'Ignorance' is qualified as 'beginningless,' or 'eternal a parte ante.'
40. The passage thus rendered looks as if it were taken, with the addition of its opening word, from the Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, iii., 9, 28; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 6, 9, 34. Ed.
41. For another translation, beginning with the introduction to Aphorism 67, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 34. Ed.
42. Dr. Ballantyne, under the misapprehension that 'the subtile body' was pointed to, here added, in brackets, 'in B. III., §§ 14, 15, &c.' Ed.
43. The term manas, the translator's 'Mind,' denotes not only one of the three internal organs, but, sometimes, as here, all three taken together. See the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 45, 46, text and foot-notes. Ed.
44. See Book II., Aph. 30, at p. 208, supra. Ed.
45. The words here bracketed I have substituted for 'the subtile body, mentioned under B. III., § 12, a.' Ed.
46. See Book II., Aph. 26, at p. 206, supra. Ed.
47. Intended to represent antah́karaṇa, 'internal organ.' Vide supra, p. 370, note 4. Ed.
48. The very inferior, because ambigous, reading, in the original, manas, I have changed to buddhi, and have displaced Dr. Ballantyne's corresponding 'Mind.' Ed.
49. Vyavasáya. For its synonym, adkyavasáya, vide supra, p. 209, note 1. Ed.
50. Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, iv., 10. Professor Gough translates differently: 'Let the sage know that Prakṛiti is Máyá, and that Maheśwara is the Máyin, or arch-illusionist. All this shifting world is filled with portions of him.' A foot-note explains 'Maheśwara' as intending 'Íśwara, Rudra, Hara, or Śiva.' Philosophy of the Upanishads. p. 224. Ed.
51. Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, vi., 19. Professor Gough renders as follows: 'Without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unsullied.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 233. Ed.
52. See Book IV., Aph. 21, a., and Aph. 31, b., at pp. 301 and 310, supra. Ed.
53. Vásaná; for which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
54. Pratiyogin; on which vide supra, p. 342, note 3. Ed.
55. Samaváya; of which the preferable rendering, proposed by Professor Cowell, is 'interpenetration.' Ed.
56. Read, instead of 'the case is otherwise disposed of,' 'the establishment [which they lead to] is otherwise.' Ed.
57. See the preceding note. Ed.
58. Nimitta, 'instrumental cause.' Nimitta-káraṇa is rendered 'occasional cause' at p. 194, supra. Colebrooke's representatives are 'chief or especial cause' and 'efficient cause.' Ed.
59. Nimitta-káraṇa. Vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.
60. See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed.
61. Brahmatwa, the abstract of Brahma. Ed.
62. Brahma-bháva, the same as brahmatwa. Ed.
63. See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed.
64. Here and below, this renders vásaná, on which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
65. The rendering given above is susceptible of improvement; and so, very probably, is that which follows: 'Where, moreover, there is influence from an obstruction [like that offered by sleep], mental impression does not inform one of objects [and, hence, one is then exempt from desires, &c., and in a state identical with that of emancipation]: a cause [of desires, &c.; and such is mental impression,] does not countervail what is predominant, [e.g., sleep, which is, as it were, temporary Brahmahood or emancipation].'
Aniruddha's interpretation of this obscure aphorism, possibly by reason of his elliptical mode of expression, is far from clear. His view of its sense is, certainly, peculiar. Ed.
66. Sanskára, here used as synonymous with vásaná. Ed.
67. Here, and often below, 'impression' is to render sanskára. Ed.
68. Read, instead of 'lasts out,' 'brings about.' Ed.
69. This phrase is meant to translate sanskára. Ed.
70. Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva here end one aphorism, and treat what follows as a second. Vijnána formally defends the reading to which he gives the preference. Ed.
71. Nágeśa pretty evidently does not regard these words as an aphorism. Ed.
72. Buddhi, rendered 'intellect' at pp. 196, &c., supra. Ed.
73. The world, viewed as Brahmá's egg, is fabled to be surrounded by seven envelopes. One of these is the ávaraṇa-tejas, Dr. Ballantyne's 'empyrean fire.' See Professor Wilson's translation of the Vishṇu-puráṇa (ed. 1864, &c.), vol. i., p. 40. I have to thank Prof. Cowell for this reference. Ed.
74. Vide supra, p. 310, note 4. Ed.
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