Philosophy and Religion / Surendranath Dasgupta: A History of Indian Philosophy

Surendranath Dasgupta

A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1

Chapter VI: The Jaina Philosophy

1. The Origin of Jainism

Notwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophical notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, and some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigantha and their leader Nâtaputta Varddhamâna Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahâvîra the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career.

Thus Mahâvîra was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tïrthaṇkara) of Jainism¹. His predecessor Pârśva, the last Tîrthaṇkara but one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahâvîra, while Pârśva's predecessor Ariṣṭanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before Mahâvîra's Nirvâṇa. The story in Uttarâdhyayanasûtra that a disciple of Pârśva met a disciple of Mahâvîra and brought about the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahâvîra seems to suggest that this Pârśva was probably a historical person.

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable Tirthankaras. In the present period the first Tîrthaṇkara was Ṛṣabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamâna Mahâvîra. All Tîrthaṇkaras have reached mokṣa at their death, and they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped².

Two Sects of Jainism.³

There are two main sects of Jains, Śvetâmbaras (wearers of white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as the Tîrthaṇkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of Mahâvîra was not removed from the womb of Devanandâ to that of Triśalâ as the Śvetâmbaras contend, thirdly that a monk who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mokṣa, fourthly that no woman can reach Mokṣa⁴. The Digambaras deny the canonical works of the Śvetâmbaras and assert that these had been lost immediately after Mahâvîra. The origin of the Digambaras is attributed to Śivabhûti (A.D. 83) by the Śvetâmbaras as due to a schism in the old Śvetâmbara church, of which there had already been previous to that seven other schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and that under Bhadrabâhu, the eighth sage after Mahâvîra, the last Tîrthaṇkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphâlakas with laxer principles, from which developed the present sect of Śvetâmbaras (A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times from the Śvetâmbaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, though there is practically no difference about the main creed. It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than those of the Śvetâmbaras, if we except the canonical books of the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called gacchas, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahâvîra (sthavirâvali, paṭṭâvali, gurvâvali) and also many legends about them such as those in the Kalpasûtra, the Pariśiṣṭa-parvan of Hemacandra, etc.

The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen Pûrvas and the eleven Aṇgas. The Pûrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were gradually lost. The works known as the eleven Aṇgas are now the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these are Âcâra, Sûtrakṛta, Sthâna, Samavâya Bhagavatî, Jñâtadharmakathâs, Upâsakadaśâs, Antak ṛtadaśâs Anuttaraupapâtikadaśâs, Praśnavyâkaraṇa, Vipâka. In addition to these there are the twelve Upâṇgas⁵, the ten Prakîrṇas⁶, six Chedasûtras⁷, Nândî and Anuyogadvâra and four Mûlasûtras (Uttarâdhyayana, Âvaśyaka, Daśavaikâlika, and Piṇḍaniryukti). The Digambaras however assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhamâgadhî, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prâkrit and that of the later works Jaina Mahârâṣṭrî. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain systematic expositions of their faith in Prâkrit and Sanskrit. Many commentaries have also been written upon these independent treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umâsvâti's Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra(1-85 A.D.). Some of the most important later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are Viśeṣâvaśyakabhâṣya, Jaina Tarkavârttika, with the commentary of Śântyâcâryya, Dravyasaṃgraha of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.), Syâdvâdamañjarî of Malliṣena (1292 A.D.), Nyâyâvatâra of Siddhasena Divâkara (533 A.D.), Parîkṣâmukhasûtralaghuv ṛtti of Anantavîryya (1039 A.D.), Prameyakamalamârtaṇḍa of Prabhâcandra (825 A.D.), Yogaśâstra of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.), and Pramâṇanayatattvâlokâlaṃkâra of Deva Sûri (1086-1169 A.D.). I am indebted for these dates to Vidyâbhûṣaṇa's Indian Logic.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and Prâkrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. Samarâicca-kahâ, Upamitabhavaprapañca-kathâ in Prâkrit, and the Yaśastilaka of Somadeva and Dhanapâla's Tilakamañjarî); Jaina Sanskrit poems both in the Purâṇa and Kâvya style and hymns in Prâkrit and Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic deserve special notice⁸.

Some General Characteristics of the Jains.

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces, Eastern Râjputâna and the Punjab. The head-quarters of the Śvetâmbaras are in Gujarat and Western Râjputâna, but they are to be found also all over Northern and Central India.

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to bare necessaries, and these he must beg--clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it⁹. The outfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (câmara)¹⁰. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out. The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The laymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in the upâśrayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist vihâras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture, etc., and has thrust them into commerce¹¹.

Life of Mahâvîra.

Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a Kṣattriya of the Jñâta clan and a native of Vaiśâli (modern Besarh, 27 miles north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhârtha and Trîśalâ. The Śvetâmbaras maintain that the embryo of the Tîrthaṇkara which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandâ was then transferred to the womb of Trîśalâ. This story the Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents were the worshippers of Pârśva and gave him the name Varddhamâna (Vîra or Mahâvîra). He married Yaśodâ and had a daughter by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained omniscience (kevala, cf. bodhi of the Buddhists). He lived to preach for forty-two years more, and attained mokṣa (emancipation) some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C.¹².

The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chândogya Upaniṣad held that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g. the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (nâma-rûpa)¹³. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities, have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upaniṣads regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance, as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere, for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of quality as a new existence.

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and possibly of some of the Upaniṣads too, and they had also a solution to offer. They held that it was not true that substance alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances. Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that there was no permanent substance but merely the change of passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are three elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appear to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated; (3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form, has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold" are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed, and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (sat) then is neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit, which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent (dhruva) accession of some new qualities (utpâda) and loss of some old qualities (vyaya)¹⁴. The solution of Jainism is thus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on grounds of common-sense experience.

The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekântavâda).

This conception of being as the union of the permanent and change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekântavâda or what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutism of the Upaniṣads and the pluralism of the Buddhists. The Jains regarded all things as anekânta (na-ekânta), or in other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely, as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence as a substance (dravya) is of the nature of a collocation of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (âkâśa), i.e. a gold jug is a dravya only in one sense of the term and not in every sense; so it is a dravya in the sense that it is a collocation of atoms and not a dravya in the sense of space or time (kâla). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone. Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajñadatta. Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a certain limited sense. All things (vastu) thus possess an infinite number of qualities (anantadharmâtmakaṃ vastu), each of which can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted senses and not absolutely¹⁵. Thus in the positive relation riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing in relation to this or that, are technically called naya¹⁶.

The Doctrine of Nayas.

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two points of view are respectively called dravyanaya and paryâyanaya¹⁷. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms, and paryayanaya in four forms, of which the first form only is important for our purposes, the other three being important rather from the point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya, saṃgraha-naya and vyavahâra-naya.

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say, I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy, whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view, in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other ones. This is the point of view from which according to the Jains the Nyâya and Vaiśeṣika schools interpret experience.

Saṃgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being." This according to the Jains is the Vedânta way of looking at things.

The vyavahâra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics, go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience, and none of these can be separated and held up as being the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the Sâṃkhya way of looking at things.

The first view of paryâya-naya called ṛjusûtra is the Buddhist view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at any given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as the true essence of our notion of things¹⁸.

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number. The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The Jains hold that the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣika, the Vedânta, the Sâṃkhya, and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize experience from one of the above four points of view, and each regards the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error (nayâbhâsa), for each standpoint represents only one of the many points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmations from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame things may be held to be true from other points of view. The truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase syât (may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another. This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syâdvâda¹⁹.

The Doctrine of Syâdvâda.

The doctrine of Syâdvâda holds that since the most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, affirmation made from whatever standpoint (naya) cannot be regarded as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some syâdasti or "may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense; all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense (syâdavaktavya); all affirmations are true as well as false in some sense (syâdasti syânnâsti); all affirmations are true as well as indefinite (syâdasti câvaktavyaśca); all affirmations are false as well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite in some sense (syâdasti syânnâsti syâdavaktavyaśca). Thus we may say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to say explicitly that "may be (syât) that the jug is," otherwise if "being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence "the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the negation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic (such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue, golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined. What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being (of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may say, may be it is an affirmation of being (syâdasti), may be it is a negation of being (syânnâsti); or I may proceed in quite another way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment "the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is," and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable--avaktavya, for how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable. Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called saptabhaṇgî holds good²⁰. The Jains say that other Indian systems each from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or senses (upâdhi). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the syâdvâda doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by syâdvâda. The validity of such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne in mind when making any judgment according to any naya, the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely according to any particular naya without any reference to other nayas as required by the syâdvâda doctrine the nayas are wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas (nayâbhâsa)²¹.

Knowledge, its value for us.

The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on Nyâyabindu says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the task of examining the nature of true knowledge (samyagjñâna or pramâṇa). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the above view of knowledge of the Buddhists²². They also say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The validity (prâmâṇya) of anything consists in this, that it directly helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what is good for us and avoid what is bad²³. The conditions that lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection. For we are not concerned with how a cognition is produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes. It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain conditions assume such a special fitness (yogyatâ) that we can have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions we do not know it²⁴. The enquiry as to the nature of the special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual experience, but are derived only by imagination (utprekṣâ), and that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (nirvikalpa jñâna). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.

Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that²⁵. The error thus consists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True knowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and distinct, and is called perceptional (pratyakṣa); when attained otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then called non-perceptional (parokṣa²⁶).

Theory of Perception.

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the Jains think that perception (pratyakṣa) reveals to us the external objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vijñânavâdin Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge of external objects by perception is gained through the senses. The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself before. The process of external perception does not thus involve the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve its purpose²⁷. Perception of an object means that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials were necessary for the development of determinate perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. The determinate stage with them is the result of the application of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence does not truly represent the presentative part²⁸.

Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge (parokṣa) differs from pratyakṣa in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. Parokṣa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively pratijñâ, hetu, drsṭânta, upanaya and nigamana, except for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process (Prameyakamalamârtaṇḍa, pp. 108, 109). When we make an inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhâva) or as invariable antecedence (kramabhâva) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference²⁹.

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance³⁰.

Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect they supposed that there was a succession of different units of effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary. The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes every moment and that new things are being renewed at each succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence associated with change--paryâya (acquirement of new qualities and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one particular standpoint (naya) whereas they alone carefully weigh experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of arthakriyâkâritva the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable abstract speculations which went directly against experience. Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it. The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment. Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious and an unconscious element in knowledge as Sâṃkhya does. Nor should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it reveals, as the Sautrântikas think, for then by copying the materiality of the object, knowledge would itself become material. Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mîmâṃsâ view that the validity (prâmâṇya) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself svataḥprâmâṇya) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence (saṃvâda) with facts. But in those cases where by previous knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without reference to objective facts (prâmâṇyamutpattau parata eva jñaptau svakârye ca svataḥ parataśca. abhyâsânabhyâsâpekṣayâ)³¹. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.

The Jîvas.

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be divided into the living (jîva) and the non-living (ajîva). The principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property of the body³² It is on account of this life-principle that the body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or a description. This is directly against the view of the great Mîmâṃsa authority Prabhâkara³³. The soul in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (ananta-darśana), infinite knowledge (ananta-jñâna), infinite bliss (ananta-sukha) and infinite power (ananta-vîrya)³⁴. It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with the exception of a few released pure souls (mukta-jîva) all the other jîvas (saṃsârin) have all their purity and power covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number. They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable space-points in our mundane world (lokâkâs`a), have a limited size (madhyama-parimâṇa) and are neither all-pervasive (vibhu) nor atomic (anu); it is on account of this that jîva is called Jivâstikâya. The word astikâya means anything that occupies space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The Jains divide the jîvas according to the number of sense-organs they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell. The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these an inner sense-organ namely manas by virtue of which they are called rational (saṃjñin) while the lower animals have no reason and are called asamjnin.

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animated by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; they live and die and are born again in another elementary body. These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants. Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. The whole universe is full of minute beings called nigodas; they are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters, having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with them like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply of souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But an infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all the souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to the present. Thus it is evident the saṃsâra will never be empty of living beings. Those of the nigodas who long for development come out and continue their course of progress through successive stages³⁵.

Karma Theory.

It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jîvas are born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already noticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter. Those which obscure right knowledge of details (jñâna) are called jñânâvaraṇîya, those which obscure right perception (darśana) as in sleep are called darśanâvaranîya, those which obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and pain are vedanîya, and those which obscure the right attitude of the soul towards faith and right conduct mohanîya³⁶. In addition to these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma which determine (1) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nationality, caste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called (1) âyuṣka karma, (2) nâma karma, (3) gotra karma, (4) antarâya karma. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are continually producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first instance is called bhâva karma, which transforms itself into dravya karma and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming into contact with the passions (kaṣâya) of the soul. These act like viscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are called the leśyâs. The feelings generated by the accumulation of the karma-matter are called bhâva-leśyâ and the actual coloration of the soul by it is called dravya-leśyâ. According as any karma matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the knowledge that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc., is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All knowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be generating them all being but mere coexistent external conditions.

After the effect of a particular karma matter (karma-vargaṇâ) is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul. This process of purging off the karmas is called nirjarâ. If no new karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging off of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as it is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma matter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and binding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and rebirth. After the death of each individual his soul, together with its karmic body (kârmaṇaśarîra), goes in a few moments to the place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.

In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its proper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the audayika state. By proper efforts karma may however be prevented from taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and this is said to be the aupaśamika state of the soul. When karma is not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul is said to be in the kṣâyika state, and it is from this state that Mokṣa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary good men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized, and some active (kṣâyopaśamika)³⁷.

Karma, Âsrava and Nirjarâ.

It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all the experiences of this world process, including births and rebirths in diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects. The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter (karma-vargaṇâ). The influx of these karma particles into the soul is called âsrava in Jainism. These karmas are produced by body, mind, and speech. The âsravas represent the channels or modes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like the channels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jains distinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds of âsravas, bhâvâsrava and karmâsrava. Bhâvâsrava means the thought activities of the soul through which or on account of which the karma particles enter the soul³⁸. Thus Nemicandra says that bhâvâsrava is that kind of change in the soul (which is the contrary to what can destroy the karmâsrava), by which the karmas enter the soul³⁹. Karmâsrava, however, means the actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These bhâvâsravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion (mithyâtva), want of control (avirati), inadvertence (pramâda), the activities of body, mind and speech (yoga) and the passions (kaṣâyas). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely ekânta (a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed), viparîta (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), vinaya (retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit), saṃśaya (doubt as to right or wrong) and ajñâna (want of any belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers). Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (hiṃsâ), falsehood (anṛta), stealing (cauryya), incontinence (abrahma), and desire to have things which one does not already possess (parigrahâkâṇkṣâ). Pramâda or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation (vikathâ), passions (kaṣâya), bad use of the five senses (indriya), sleep (nidrâ), attachment (râga)⁴⁰.

Coming to dravyâsrava we find that it means that actual influx of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight different kinds, namely jñânâvaraṇîya, darśanâvaraṇîya, vedanîya, mohanîya, âyu, nâma, gotra and antarâya. These actual influxes take place only as a result of the bhâvâsrava or the reprehensible thought activities, or changes (pariṇâma) of the soul. The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas is called bhâvabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called dravyabandha. It is on account of bhâvabandha that the actual connection between the karmas and the soul can take place⁴¹. The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with oil. Thus Gunaratna says "The influx of karma means the contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the particular kind of karma, with the soul just like the sticking of dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked at from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a material body during its saṃsâra stage⁴²." From one point of view the bondage of karma is only of puṇya and pâpa (good and bad karmas)⁴³. From another this bondage is of four kinds, according to the nature of karma (prak ṛti) duration of bondage (sthiti), intensity (anubhâga) and extension (pradeśa). The nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already mentioned, namely the jñanavaraniya karma which obscures the infinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail, darśanâvaraṇîya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledge of the soul, vedanîya karma which produces the feelings of pleasure and pain in the soul, mohanîya karma, which so infatuates souls that they fail to distinguish what is right from what is wrong, âyu karma, which determines the tenure of any particular life, nâma karma which gives them personalities, gotra karma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding for the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the performance of right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay of any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be intense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle of division, anubhâga. Pradeśa refers to the different parts of the soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The duration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due to the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas the different classification of karmas as jñânâvaranîya, etc., are due to the nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter⁴⁴.

Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhâvâsrava and dravyâsrava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush, by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by the actual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these are respectively called bhâvasaṃvara and dravyasaṃvara⁴⁵.

The bhâvasaṃvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness, abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects of desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order to avoid injury to insects (îryâ), gentle and holy talk (bhâṣa), receiving proper alms (eṣaṇâ), etc, (3) guptis or restraints of body, speech and mind, (4) dharmas consisting of habits of forgiveness, humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint, penance, abandonment indifference to any kind of gain or loss, and supreme sex-control⁴⁶, (5) anuprekṣâ consisting of meditation about the transient character of the world, about our helplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence, about our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanliness of our body and all that is associated with it, about the influx of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those karmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining true knowledge, faith and conduct, and about the essential principles of the world⁴⁷, (6) the parîṣahajaya consisting of the conquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc, and of feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) câritra or right conduct.

Next to this we come to nirjarâ or the purging off of the karmas or rather their destruction. This nirjarâ also is of two kinds bhâvanirjarâ and dravyanirjarâ. Bhâvanirjarâ means that change in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are destroyed. Dravyanirjarâ means the actual destruction of these karma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by penances before their time of fruition, called savipâka and avipâka nirjarâs respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed mokṣa or liberation is effected.

Pudgala.

The ajîva (non-living) is divided into pudgalâstikâya, dharmastikâya, adharmâstikâya, âkâśâstikâya, kâla, puṇya, pâpa. The word pudgala means matter⁴⁸, and it is called astikâya in the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (aṇu). The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell, and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic space (ghanapratarabhedena). Some combinations take place by simple mutual contact at two points (yugmapradeśa) whereas in others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive force (ojaḥpradeśa) (Prajñâpanopâṇgasûtra, pp. 10-12). Two atoms form a compound (skandha), when the one is viscous and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce the gross things of the world. There are, however, liable to constant change (pariṇâma) by which they lose some of their old qualities (guṇas) and acquire new ones. There are four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these are alike in character. The perception of grossness however is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise (as the Sâṃkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the darśanavaraṇîya and jñânavaraṇîya veil, there arises in the soul the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness (samâna-rûpatâ) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow) is technically called tiryaksâmânya. This sâmânya or generality is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity (as maintained by the Naiyâyikas) but represents only the accession of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This sameness of qualities in time is technically called ûrdhvasâmânya⁴⁹. If the atoms are looked at from the point of view of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be regarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from the point of view of substance (dravya) they are eternal.

Dharma, Adharma, Âkâśa.

The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell, sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe (lokâkâśa) and pervades every part of it. The term astikâya is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying circumstance or cause which makes motion possible, like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent or passive (udâsîna) and not an active or solicitous (preraka) cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; but if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (loka) in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma⁵⁰. Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which helps jîvas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on account of their notion that the inner activity of the jîva or the atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other extraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jîvas were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be found to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent in the region of the liberated souls.

The category of âkâśa is that subtle entity which pervades the mundane universe (loka) and the transcendent region of liberated souls (aloka) which allows the subsistence of all other substances such as dharma, adharma, jîva, pudgala. It is not a mere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness, but a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrate it. On account of its pervasive character it is called âkâśâstikâya⁵¹.

Kâla and Samaya.

Time (kâla) in reality consists of those innumerable particles which never mix with one another, but which help the happening of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change of qualities of the atoms. Kâla does not bring about the changes of qualities, in things, but just as âkaśa helps interpenetration and dharma motion, so also kâla helps the action of the transformation of new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments, hours, days, etc., is called samaya. This is the appearance of the unchangeable kâla in so many forms. Kâla thus not only aids the modifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications as moments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments, hours, etc., are its paryâyas. The unit of samaya is the time required by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement.

Jaina Cosmography.

According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning or end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experienced as results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts, ûrdhva (where the gods reside), madhya (this world of ours), and adho (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe (lokâkaśa) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement possible. Beyond the lokâkaśa there is no dharma and therefore no movement, but only space (âkaśa). Surrounding this lokakâśa are three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over the ûrdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokakâśa and (there being no dharma) remains motionless there.

Jaina Yoga.

Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation). This yoga consists of jñana (knowledge of reality as it is), śraddhâ (faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from doing all that is evil). This caritra consists of ahiṃsâ (not taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), sûnṛta (speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), asteya (not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya (abandoning lust foi all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and body), and aparigraha (abandoning attachment for all things)⁵².

These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra, that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon the virtues of ahiṃsâ, sûn ṛta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the root of all these is ahiṃsâ. The virtues of sûn ṛta, asteya and brahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrollaries of ahiṃsâ. Ahiṃsâ may thus be generalized as the fundamental ethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be passed in accordance with the standard of ahiṃsâ; sûn ṛta, asteya and brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression leads to hiṃsâ (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this is called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called mahâbrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a householder according to the anubrata standard would be mere cessation from adultery, whereas according to mahâbrata it would be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts. Ahiṃsâ according to a householder, according to anubrata, would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according to mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to any living being in any way.

Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahiṃsâ. These are (1) digvirati (to carry out activities within a restricted area and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places), (2) bhogopabhogamâna (to desist from drinking liquors, taking flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding time and place of taking meals), (3) anarthadaṇḍa consisting of (a) apadhyâna (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries, killing of one's enemies, etc.), (b) pâpopadeśa (desisting from advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing of so many insects), (c) hiṃsopakâridâna (desisting from giving implements of agriculture to people which will lead to the injury of insects), (d) pramâdacaraṇa (to desist from attending musical parties, theatres, or reading sex-literature, gambling, etc.), (4) śikṣâpadabrata consisting of (a) sâmayikabrata (to try to treat all beings equally), (b) deśâvakâśikabrata (gradually to practise the digviratibrata more and more extensively), (c) poṣadhabrata (certain other kinds of restriction), (d) atithisaṃvibhâgabrata (to make gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called aticâra, should be carefully avoided.

All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to know the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the soul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can be removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is pure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on account of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are burnt (dhyânâgnidagdhakarma) the self becomes purified. The soul is itself the saṃsâra (the cycle of rebirths) when it is overpowered by the four kaṣâyas (passions) and the senses. The four kaṣâyas are krodha (anger), mâna (vanity and pride), mâyâ (insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and lobha (greed). These kaṣâyas cannot be removed except by a control of the senses; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind (manaḥśuddhi). Without the control of the mind no one can proceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when the mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should make every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism (tapas) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachment and antipathy (râgadvcṣa) can be removed only by the purification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that man loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin (sage) that he should be free from them and become independent in the real sense of the term When a man learns to look upon all beings with equality (samatva) he can effect such a conquest over râga and dveṣa as one could never do even by the strictest asceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this samatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of meditation (bhâvanâ):

We should think of the transitoriness (anityatâ) of all things, that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day, what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure, wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles in a whirlwind.

All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will by their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of misery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we find that it fails us. This is called aśaraṇabhâvanâ (the meditation of helplessness).

Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits of the karma done in another life. We are all different from one another by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and by all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate on these aspects is called ekatvabhâvanâ and anyatvabhâvanâ. To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh, blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called aśucibhâvanâ (meditation of the impurity of the body).

To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universal friendship and compassion and the passions are removed, then only will good (śubha) accrue to me, but if on the contrary I commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil will befall me, is called âsravabhâvanâ (meditation of the befalling of evil). By the control of the âsrava (inrush of karma) comes the saṃvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and the destruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to nîrjarâ (decay and destruction of karma matter).

Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas (virtues) of self control (saṃyama), truthfulness (sûn ṛta), purity (śauca), chastity (brahma), absolute want of greed (akiñcanatâ), asceticism (tapas), forbearance, patience (kśânti), mildness (mârdava), sincerity ( ṛjutâ), and freedom or emancipation from all sins (mukti} can alone help us in the achievement of the highest goal. These are the only supports to which we can look. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called dharmasvâkhyâtatâbhâvanâ.

Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also of the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the diverse conditions of men. These two are called lokabhâvanâ and bodhibhâvanâ.

When by the continual practice of the above thoughts man becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings, and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a mind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should take to the performance of dhyâna or meditation by deep concentration. The samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhyâna are interdependent, so that without dhyâna there is no samatva and without samatva there is no dhyâna. In order to make the mind steady by dhyâna one should think of maitrî (universal friendship), pramoda (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of men), karuṇâ (universal compassion) and mâdhyastha (indifference to the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any note of sinners). The Jaina dhyâna consists in concentrating the mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The dhyâna however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to making the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed towards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the final extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a complete course of moral discipline which leads to the purification of the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu yoga of Patañjali or even of the Buddhists⁵³.

Jaina Atheism.⁵⁴

The Naiyâyikas assert that as the world is of the nature of an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and this agent is Îśvara (God). To this the Jain replies, "What does the Naiyâyika mean when he says that the world is of the nature of an effect"? Does he mean by "effect," (1) that which is made up of parts (sâvayava), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (vikâritvam). Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts"? If it means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (sâmânya) existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence destructible, but these the Naiyâyikas regard as being partless and eternal. If it means "that which has parts," then even "space" (âkâśa) has to be regarded as "effect," but the Naiyâyika regards it as eternal.

Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of a thing which were previously non-existent," for in that case one could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.

Again if "effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as having been made," then it would apply even to space, for when a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in the hollow which he dug.

If it means "that which is liable to change," then one could suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require another creator to create him and he another, and so on ad infinitum. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to change with reference to his creative activity.

Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some time and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects." But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are "effects," then that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue of that. And even atoms would be "effects," for they also undergo changes of colour by heat.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke. If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects, and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have a vicious circle (anyonyâśraya).

Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by an agent, then such an agent should have a body for we have never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held that we should consider the general condition of agency only, namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind of body. If you take the instances with some kind of effects such as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it is said that these are also made by God, then you have an argument in a circle (cakraka), for this was the very matter which you sought to prove.

Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists. Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible, for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that he can be all-creator.

Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such a blind destiny (ad ṛṣṭa) might take the place of God. If He took to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of admitting him at all? You may rather say that the world came into being out of its own nature.

It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create this world. This is against all experience.

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists, you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will. But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense with the supposition altogether⁵⁵.

Mokṣa (emancipation).

The motive which leads a man to strive for release (mokṣa) is the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (anantajñâna) and infinite perception (anantadarśana). In the saṃsâra state on account of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and that time as ordinary knowledge (mati), testimony (śruta), supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (avadhi), and direct knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (manaḥparyâya). In the state of release however there is omniscience (kevala-jñâna) and all things are simultaneously known to the perfect (kevalin) as they are. In the saṃsâra stage the soul always acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.

It may not be out of place to mention here that though the karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action (anantavîrya), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated. If man had not this anantavîrya in him he might have been eternally under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured his bondage (bandha). But since man is the repository of this indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his highest good.

Footnotes

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