Philosophy and Religion / Vedânta-Sûtras (Brahma Sutras)

Vedânta-Sûtras, Second Adhyâya

Reverence to the Highest Self!

First Pâda

1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smritis; we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other Smritis.

2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects of the pradhâna, according to the Sânkhya system).

3. Thereby the Yoga (Smriti) is refuted.

4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.

5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion.

6. But it is seen.

7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).

8. On account of such consequences at the time of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.

9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.

10. And because the objections (raised by the Sânkhya against the Vedânta doctrine) apply to his view also.

11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.

13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versâ) there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as 'origin' and the like.

15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.

16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is.

17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply) not so, (because the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality (merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.

18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.

19. And like a piece of cloth.

20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.

21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.

22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.

23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be established.

24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman does).

25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in ordinary experience.

26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).

28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods ¹, &c.).

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise.

30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).

31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).

32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive.

33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.

34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture) declares.

35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.

36. (The beginninglessness of the world; recommends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).

37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).

Second Pâda

1. That which is inferred (by the Sânkhyas, viz. the pradhâna) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.

3. If it be said (that the pradhâna moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).

4. And because (the pradhâna), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)

5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhâna modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).

6. Even if we admit (the Sânkhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhâna).

7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhâna) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).

8. And, again, (the pradhâna cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gunas).

9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pradhâna) being devoid of the power of intelligence.

10. And moreover (the Sânkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions.

11. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long originate from the short and the atomic.

12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adrishta inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).

13. And because in consequence of samavâya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning.

14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).

15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the Vaiseshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.

16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.

17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.

18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).

19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality; we say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links).

20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.

23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non-entity).

25. And on account of remembrance.

26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.

27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non-active people also.

28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them).

29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream.

30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Bauddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external things).

31. And on account of the momentariness (of the âlayavigñâna, it cannot be the abode of mental impressions).

32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one thing, (the Gaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).

34. And likewise (there results from the Gaina, doctrine) non-universality of the Self.

35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of the soul).

36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of size, at any time).

37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the inappropriateness (of that doctrine).

38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhâna).

39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord).

40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhâna is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas cannot be accepted).

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vâsudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in Sûtra 42).

45. And on account of contradictions.

Third Pâda

1. Ether ² (does) not (originate), on account of the absence of scriptural statement.

2. But there is (a scriptural statement of the origination of ether).

3. (The Vedic statement concerning the origination of ether) has a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of the origination of ether).

4. And on account of the word (of the Veda).

5. The one (word 'sprang') may be (taken in its secondary as well as in its primary sense), like the word 'Brahman.'

6. The non-abandonment of the promissory statements (results only) from the non-difference (of the entire world from Brahman), according to the words of the Veda.

7. But wherever there are effects, there is division; as in ordinary life.

8. Hereby air (also) is explained.

9. But there is no origin of that which is (i.e. of Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such an origin).

10. Fire (is produced) thence (i.e. from air); for thus (the text) declares.

11. Water (is produced from fire).

12. The earth (is meant by the word 'anna'), on account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other passages.

13. But on account of the indicatory mark supplied by their reflecting (i.e. by the reflection attributed to the elements), he (i.e. the Lord is the creative principle abiding within the elements).

14. The order (in which the elements are retracted into Brahman) is the reverse of that (i.e. the order in which they are created); this is proved (by its agreement with observation).

15. If it be said that between (Brahman and the elements) the intellect and mind (are mentioned; and that therefore their origination and retractation are to be placed) somewhere in the series, on account of there being inferential signs (whereby the order of the creation of the elements is broken); we deny that, on account of the non-difference (of the organs and the elements).

16. But the designation (as being born and dying) abides in the (bodies of beings) moving and non-moving; it is secondary (metaphorical) if applied to the soul, as the existence (of those terms) depends on the existence of that (i.e. the body).

17. The (living) Self is not (produced) as there is no scriptural statement, and as it is eternal according to them (i.e. scriptural passages).

18. For this very reason (the individual soul is) intelligent.

19. (On account of the scriptural declarations) of (the soul's) passing out, going and returning, (the soul is of atomic size).

20. And on account of the two latter (i.e. going and returning) being connected with their Self (i.e. the agent), (the soul is of atomic size).

21. If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, on account of scriptural statements about what is not that (i.e. what is opposed to atomic size); we deny that, on account of the other one (the highest Self) being the subject-matter (of those passages).

22. And also on account of direct statement, and of inference.

23. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.

24. If it be said (that the two cases are not parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode (present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in the case of the soul); we deny that, on account of the acknowledgment (by scripture, of a special place of the soul), viz. within the heart.

25. Or on account of (its) quality (viz. intelligence), as in cases of ordinary experience.

26. The extending beyond is as in the case of odour.

27. And thus (scripture also) declares.

28. On account of the separate statement (of soul and intelligence).

29. But it is designated thus (i.e. as atomic), on account of its having for its essence the qualities of that (i.e. the buddhi); as in the case of the intelligent Self (i.e. Brahman).

30. The objection (raised above) is not valid, since (the connexion of the soul with the buddhi) exists as long as the soul; it being thus observed (in scripture).

31. On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that (connexion) which exists (potentially); like virile power.

32. Otherwise (if no manas existed) there would result either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (i.e. of the soul or of the senses).

33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of scripture having a purport (thereby).

34. And on account of (the text) teaching its wandering about.

35. On account of its taking.

36. (The soul is an agent) also because it is designated as such with regard to actions; if it were not such, there would be a change of designation.

37. The absence of restriction is as in the case of perception.

38. On account of the reversal of power.

39. And on account of the impossibility of meditation (samâdhi).

40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion.

41. But from the highest (Lord there result samsâra and moksha), because scripture teaches that.

42. But with a view to the efforts made (by the soul) (the Lord makes it act), on account of the (otherwise resulting) purportlessness of the injunctions and prohibitions, &c.

43. (The soul is) a part of the Lord, on account of the declarations of difference, and (because) in a different way also some record that (Brahman) is of the nature of slaves, fishers, and so on.

44. And on account of the mantra.

45. Moreover it is so stated in Smriti.

46. (As the soul is affected by pleasure and pain) not so the highest (Lord); as in the case of light and so on.

47. And the Smritis state (that).

48. (The possibility of) injunctions and prohibitions (results) from the connexion (of the Self) with bodies; as in the case of light and so on.

49. And on account of the non-extension (of the individual soul), there is no confusion (of the results of actions).

50. And (the individual soul is) an appearance (reflection) only.

51. On account of the unseen principle being non-limitative.

52. And this is also the case in resolutions, &c.

53. (Should it be said that distinction of pleasure, pain, &c., results) from (difference of) place; we say no, on account of the (Self's) being within (all things).

Fourth Pâda

1. Thus the vital airs.

2. On account of the impossibility of a secondary (origin of the prânas).

3. On account of that (word which indicates origin) being enunciated at first (in connexion with the prânas).

4. Because speech is preceded by that (viz. fire and the other elements).

5. (The prânas are) seven, on account of this being understood (from scriptural passages) and of the specification (of those seven).

6. But (there are also, in addition to the seven prânas mentioned,) the hands and so on. This being a settled matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude) thus (viz. that there are seven prânas only).

7. And (they are) minute.

8. And the best (i.e. the chief vital air).

9. (The chief prâna is) neither air nor function, on account of its being mentioned separately.

10. But (the prâna is subordinate to the soul) like the eye, &c., on account of being taught with them (the eye, &c.), and for other reasons.

11. And on account of (its) not being an instrument the objection is not (valid); for thus (scripture) declares.

12. It is designated as having five functions like mind.

13. And it is minute.

14. But there is guidance (of the prânas) by fire, &c., on account of that being declared by scripture.

15. (It is not so) (because the prânas are connected) with that to which the prânas belong (i.e. the individual soul), (a thing we know) from scripture.

16. And on account of the permanence of this (viz. the embodied soul).

17. They (the prânas) are senses, on account of being so designated, with the exception of the best (the mukhya prâna).

18. On account of the scriptural statement of difference.

19. And on account of the difference of characteristics.

20. But the fashioning of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, on account of the teaching (of scripture).

21. The flesh, &c., originates from earth, according to the scriptural statement; and (so also) in the case of the two other (elements).

22. But on account of their distinctive nature there is a (distinctive) designation of them.

Footnotes

YOU MAY ALSO LIKE